Rallying against life as unlivable as a feminist issue: Seminar on Judith Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly by Zaharijević, Adriana
53
Seminar on Judith Butler’s 
“Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly”
“Lots of consequential movements have started 
in small rooms in hostile environments.”
The seminar “Judith Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly” 
was held in Belgrade on November 21st, 2015. The texts assembled in this 
thematic block are the contributions of researchers who kindly answered 
the call to join the conversation about this book. The order of presentations 
respected improvised thematic units. The printed transcription of Judith 
Butler’s answers and comments followed the edited and elaborated contri-
butions of each participant, complemented by their lists of references. Some 
chose to submit their original texts, prepared for the occasion, while others 
were subsequently inspired by the seminar, evoking what they heard and 
read in the meantime.
Sanja Milutinović Bojanić
(CAS SEE, University of Rijeka)
sanja.bojanic@uniri.hr
Nothing less than those evils, which threaten the whole species, can disturb 
the calm sleep of the philosopher, and force him from his bed. One man 
may with impunity murder another under his windows; he has nothing to 
do but clap his hands to his ears, argue a little with himself to hinder 
nature, that startles within him, from identifying him with the unhappy 
sufferer. Savage man wants this admirable talent; and for want of wisdom 
and reason, is always ready foolishly to obey the first whispers of humanity. 
In riots and street-brawls the populace flock together, the prudent man 
sneaks off. They are the dregs of the people, the poor basket and barrow-
women that part the combatants, and hinder gentle folks from cutting one 
another’s throats. (Rousseau, 1994: 112)
Rousseau’s words from A Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of 
the Inequality Among Mankind ring out forcefully and passionately in their 
political incorrectness. What mob, what rabble and barrow-women could 
react more authentically than the prudent man in preventing a massacre? 
Who would even be the “prudent men” of our times? Would they not be 
those Judith Butler calls “discursive strategists” (Butler 2015: 3) who rely 
on modes of public discourse, marketing, and propaganda to decide the 
question of which states and which popular movements will or will not be 
called democratic? It is not that the masses are less prone to violence, nor 
are they free of seeking conflict, yet street clashes and fights remain con-
fined to crime pages of dailies and obscure histories, their larger impact 
blunted. In contrast, the epidemic of violent and cunning strategies aiming 
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to suffocate struggles against inequality is on the rise, its pathways and 
driving forces difficult to map out, pinpoint and contain. Sleeping uneasily, 
Butler has been on the road nearly five years – beginning around the time 
of the Tahrir Square events, having participated in Occupy Wall Street and 
the gatherings at Zuccotti Park, but also in the West Bank where she led a 
seminar at Bir Zeit University and visited a theater in Jenin, to Black Lives 
Matter and Gezi Park protests – noting reasons, posing questions and nego-
tiating, putting up signposts and methods that could potentially describe 
or sketch out reasons that justify not only the purpose of public assembly 
that signifies resistance to inequality (and is this not Rousseau’s motive?), 
but also its place and function in society at large.
Did you notice the interloper there? What is theory doing, what the phi-
losopher? And how can we articulate something that Judith Butler in this 
book names “a performativity of assembly”? What is the context of creation 
of public assemblies? How are they put into action? How is the assembly 
of a people (of the ninety-nine percent) arranged, realized and executed 
(all words under the umbrella of the performative)? Who are the people 
and how is their will expressed? Are we speaking the language of demos 
and democracy? What are modalities of public discourses and how is the 
demarcation line of a people drawn? Before embarking on her argument 
and gradually expanding her premises, Butler writes: “Groups suddenly 
coming together in large numbers can be a source of hope as well as fear, 
and just as there are always good reasons to fear the dangers of mob action, 
there are good grounds for discerning political potential in unpredictable 
assemblies.” (Butler 2015:1) It is difficult to count a group, yet it is ex-
tremely important to collect it, call it together, despite the various de-
nominators of belonging (whether geographic or linguistic), bring them 
together into infrastructures whose public use could guarantee equal rights 
of expression to all.
The first chapters of the book focus on the distinction among kinds and 
forms of assembly that could carry clear political content. Judith Butler 
notes the disagreement between the political forms of democracy and the 
principle of popular sovereignty. Thus Rousseau’s first whispers of humanity 
can be detected in the bodies mobilized in spaces where, exposed and laid 
open, they become clearly vulnerable and precarious. Hence Butler writes: 
“When bodies assemble on the street, in the square, or in other forms of 
public space (including virtual ones), they are exercising a plural and 
performative right to appear, one that asserts and instates the body in the 
midst of the political field, and which, in its expressive and signifying func-
tion, delivers a bodily demand for a more livable set of economic, social 
and political conditions no longer afflicted by induced forms of precarity” 
(Butler 2015: 11). We might recognize such forms of togetherness as being 
in the state of becoming and potential forms of popular sovereignty. However, 
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is any action of the people “democracy in action?” When squares, streets, 
devastated portions of cities, phantom neighborhoods and occupied ter-
ritories experience the mobilization of the vulnerable and exposed, do 
these forms of assembly carry within themselves those “fugitive” moments 
of democracy that on so many occasions Jacques Derrida too named always 
and ever in the future momentum as démocratie à venir? Indeed, fugitive 
moments of democracy are not only transient, since, in the words of Sheldon 
Wolin, “democracy is not about where the political is located but how it is 
experienced” (Wolin 1994: 18). The singular experience of fracture and 
partialness, insufficiency and incompleteness, are manifestations of a bad 
world in which there is no room for content of spontaneously changing 
experience. Such a world necessitates change, because as Butler suggests, 
following Adorno, it is not possible to live the “good life” in a bad world, 
and the imperative ought to be leading a social life “implicating us in a 
larger social, economic, and infrastructural world that exceeds our perspective 
and the situated, first-person modality of ethical questioning.” Butler’s 
book indeed comprises published notes, and not ready made answers; yet in 
moving towards a performative theory of assembly, the author is certainly 
not discouraged by the insufficient vulnerability of ones or the ignorance 
of precarity of the others. 
By briefly looking at the last paragraph from the introduction of the book, 
I would like to draw attention to one such “note.” Namely, the constructive 
concern that groups of people assembling in large numbers could be both 
“a source of hope as well as fear” is precisely the introductory oxymoron 
with which the book strengthens its argumentation, while at the same time 
marking the rhythm in which it builds its sturdy construction. Certainly it 
is a question of measure – measure of vulnerability or precarity that ought 
to alternate and be spread out so that it awakens vulnerability in the in-
transigently strong, yet be a source of strength for the endlessly weak. It 
ought to represent what Butler describes as the “paradoxical condition of a 
form of social solidarity both mournful and joyful.” Flights of hope neces-
sarily replace picks of fear and anxiety, alternating the paradoxical condition 
of action:
Indeed, the very conception of human action as pervasively conditioned 
implies that when we ask the basic ethical and political question, how 
ought I to act, we implicitly reference the conditions of the world that make 
that act possible or, as is increasingly the case under conditions of precar-
ity, that undermine the conditions of acting. What does it mean to act 
together when the conditions for acting together are devastated or falling 
away? Such an impasse can become the paradoxical condition of a form 
of social solidarity both mournful and joyful, a gathering enacted by bodies 
under duress or in the name of duress, where the gathering itself signifies 
persistence and resistance. (Butler 2015: 23)
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Judith Butler
Introductory remarks
First of all, at the very outset, I would like to thank all the people who have 
worked so hard not only to put this wonderful conference together, but to 
make this visit so smooth and interesting and productive for me. So, I really 
thank you all. If I might just say one more thing, I left last night realizing 
that I have not answered Ksenija’s question about reason, feeling, male and 
female, active and passive, how to think those dualities in relation to one 
another. If I may just take a moment to do that, I would feel better and per-
haps Ksenija, if you are there, you will feel better, too.1
I think one of the great contributions of feminist philosophy has been to 
call into question those polarities between reason and feeling, male and 
female, active and passive, and to show that they also tend to hierarchize 
the binary relations that they install. And, of course we are always in a bind 
once we have shown that reason is understood to master feeling or should 
master feeling, just as male should subordinate female, just as activity 
should subordinate passivity. We are always in a bind because the easiest 
strategy is simply to reverse the value given to the dyad and assert the su-
periority of the female, the feeling and the passive. Now, the problem with 
that gesture is really obvious, (there are, after all, many so-called women 
who are not going to like that particular identification), and there is a 
tendency to believe that there are still these discrete, polar opposite differ-
ences between the sexes, rather than to explore the complex continuum 
that gender is. You will note that gender, for me, enters at this moment 
when the dimorphic imaginary of sex is contested. When writing this book 
on assembly, I was most interested in rethinking the difference between 
passivity and activity in light of the problem – and it is a political problem 
– of how and when do people take action, gather or become assembled. It 
is usually in the midst of conditions in which they are undergoing something 
that they did not choose, and which undermines their capacity to choose. 
They are suffering, there is a passive suffering of a condition that is not 
chosen, and yet there is an action that is not just my action or your action, 
but an acting together in the now, right? We are coordinating what is going 
1  Ksenija Forca (Feminist and queer activist, Belgrade) posed the last question during 
the previous night discussion, after the lecture “Vulnerability/Resistance”. Her question 
concerned an analysis of interconnections between binary dichotomies such as mascu-
linity/femininity, irrational/rational, vulnerability/ resistance, active/passive etc. In 
patriarchal (mainstream) discourse and normative societies, femininity, passivity, ir-
rationality and vulnerability are considered worthless and undesirable in constituting 
any (political) subject. Since Judith Butler wrote about these dichotomies and intercon-
nections in her previous work, it would be interesting to see such an analysis, given the 
topic of the book and her lecture in Belgrade.
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to happen even though coordination is not mastery or prediction, so we do 
not know precisely what is going to happen.
One of the questions I am trying to think about is: how do we move beyond 
the temptation to cling to the polar opposite of the passive, the receptive or 
the responsive. When we talk about responsiveness – is that passive, is that 
active, is that exactly both – a mode of being affected and moving toward 
what affects us? Is that a term – responsiveness – that defies the binary op-
position itself? Responsive is already alive, animated, moving in the direction 
toward something else, but also affected by something exterior. It is not a 
passive standstill, it is not a pure being-acted-on. It is being acted on and 
being animated by virtue of being acted on in a certain way. And that being 
or becoming animated, which could bring us into all kinds of philosophical 
discussions about Spinoza, for instance, strikes me as the in-between of the 
active and passive, or calls for a different kind of configuration that moves 
us beyond the opposition itself. And I think that this moving beyond the 
strict polarity of active and passive is true about gender performativity. You 
could say that the theory of gender performativity bears both conventional 
masculine and feminine qualities and even enacts the critique of the binary. 
In other words, if I am being acted upon but also acting, am I being active 
or passive, or in-between, or am I in a historical process that involves all 
kinds of combination? Norms act on us, but one way that they act is by shaping 
the form of our response and appropriation to them. That response and 
appropriation also has the power to reshape that norm, or those norms – the 
ones we never chose. So I guess my interest is not to trans-valuate the binary 
but to move us through it, to show us another kind of possibility outside of 
hierarchy and binary opposition.
Jelena Vasiljević 
(IFDT, University of Belgrade)
jvasiljevic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs
Vulnerability, infrastructure, and (non)violence: 
preliminary thoughts on Judith Butler’s Notes 
Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly 
Judith Butler’s latest book is a profoundly engaging read, tackling many 
contemporary burning issues through highly dense theoretical considera-
tions. Many of its passages made me embark on different and often mutu-
ally unrelated chains of thoughts and associations, but here I will try to 
single out three themes for reflection and to establish some connections 
between them.
One theme that kept emerging as a thread connecting different chapters, 
which I find impossible to ignore, not only in the context of its presence in 
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the book, but due to its importance for reflecting our contemporary condition 
more generally, is vulnerability. Even though the book offers many important 
insights into the conditions generating unequal distribution of precarity and 
vulnerability – or maybe precisely because it does so – I could not help but 
think of an opposite process actually taking place: the one of the relatively 
even distribution of vulnerability we are starting to experience today. Maybe 
we could claim that this is precisely the reason (or at least one of the reasons) 
vulnerability has become such a widespread notion and framework for think-
ing our present political and social conditions. In my mind this leads to a 
rather pessimistic view: namely, we are overwhelmingly stressing the pre-
carious conditions of our modern lives because of a certain randomness of 
precarity, which hitherto has not been its defining feature. Certain equilib-
rium of the conditions generating vulnerability – modern history has made 
us used to relating vulnerability to certain social classes, ethnic and minor-
ity groups, or regions in the world (“destined” to be politically and socially 
unstable) – has collapsed with neoliberalism and geographical and social 
distribution of vulnerability has become less predictable. And we can already 
see the confusion this insight is creating – just think of some of the reactions 
to paralysis we could find on social media after the recent attacks in Paris 
that went along the lines of “why don’t you mourn Beirut bodies the same 
way you mourn Paris bodies.” Of course this issue is immensely complex, 
polarizing and certainly deserving of a much more serious approach. But the 
point is this: we are moving towards becoming relatively equally vulnerable 
– exposed to uncertainties and failing infrastructures; or at least previously 
reliable geographical and social containers of vulnerability no longer work 
(bodies in Paris can be vulnerable just like bodies in Beirut; bodies of adjunct 
professors are becoming vulnerable just like the bodies of construction work-
ers). Pessimism comes from this insight: we are resenting not precarity as 
such, but the fact that it no longer resides in predictable places, that it could 
affect anyone, even us. This idea should urge us to reconsider our deeply 
embedded hierarchical visions of humanity.
Another matter I want to briefly turn to is already mentioned – infrastructure. 
Even though we are usually lamenting its steady decline and the loss of its 
supportive functions (which we are right to do) – precisely rendering us 
more vulnerable – here I want to remind of its totality, namely to underline 
that infrastructure supports inequalities and distribution of vulnerability as 
well. Many passages in the book indicate precisely this point: the non-pre-
political nature of infrastructure, the way very conditions enabling political 
enactment are political themselves. Infrastructure in not un-biased, it is not 
neutral – it does not only safeguard us against precarity but simultaneously 
(re)produces precarious and vulnerable bodies. (As vulnerability stems from 
relationality; relations are constituted within socio-material contexts [call 
them cultures, societies, groups…]; contexts are only played out through 
concrete infrastructures…). 
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So, finally, for me, the most important question is how to non-ambivalently 
connect and relate to one another: infrastructure, livable life and non-violence 
(as livable life is another important thread in Butler’s book; an ideal and a 
norm that has to depend on supportive infrastructure and on the absence 
of violence). To this we must answer: what is a livable life? It has to be 
saturated with norms, but whose norms? It has to be supported by infra-
structure, which has to be non-exclusive – even though, as it was mentioned, 
infrastructure is political; and does the non-exclusionary political exist?
At the very end, to summarize my thoughts on these matters and worries 
they incite, let me ask another question seemingly unrelated to previous 
concerns: is the life of an untouchable (a Dalit) a livable life? If not, by whose 
standards? The question is not random, as the train of thoughts that led me 
here included the figure of Gandhi (being emblematic in the context of 
Butler’s book because of the argument of non-violence as action), his op-
position to Ambedkar regarding the latter’s fight for the abolition of casts, 
and possible translation (in terms of the Butler’s book) of Gandhi’s response 
to him: the abolition of casts would destroy the infrastructure of the Indian 
society, and that would incite violence.
This historical vignette is invoked as a reminder for all our present and future 
theoretical efforts to preserve and establish infrastructure for enabling liv-
able lives and fighting violence: an argument was raised in the name of 
preventing violence and preserving infrastructure (by a figure who gave 
non-violence his name) to maintain one of the most violent systems of human 
relations this world has ever known. 
Éric Fassin 
(University of Paris 8, LEGS-CNRS, Paris)
eric.fassin@legs.cnrs.fr
It is a pleasure to have one more chance to speak here in Belgrade, all lined 
up for discussion. Not only am I delighted to have yet another opportunity 
to engage Judith Butler’s work, but I am also fascinated by this dispositif 
which reminds me of the pictures of Tito that we glanced at as we made our 
way through the building to this event: indeed, this looks like an intellec-
tual version of the Politburo… though I must add that, in this case, I am not 
worried: our judgment on Butler’s new book will be unanimously positive. 
In order to express my gratitude to the organizers, I shall be brief. 
Let me start with a famous scene from the French Revolution, which may 
truly be called its foundational moment. In 1789, representatives of the 
Estates-General met in a hall, the Jeu de Paume; but they were trapped. The 
King’s men wanted to force them out. Mirabeau’s refusal to have their group 
disbanded before they could draft a constitution transformed their resistance 
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into a historical gesture that shook monarchy and inaugurated a demo-
cratic era: “Go tell your master the King that we are here by the will of the 
people, and that we shall be removed only at the point of bayonets.” This 
became an oath soon to be immortalized in heroic form in an unfinished 
painting by David.
What I want to point out is that this scene conflates two different meanings 
of the French phrase “espace publique.” On the one hand, there is the public 
sphere: these men claim to speak as representatives of the nation as they 
recreated themselves as a National Assembly. On the other hand, there is a 
private space (a “jeu de paume”, that is the king’s tennis court) that becomes 
a public one (the “Jeu de Paume” becoming the house of the people). 
My question is: how are the two meanings, the abstract space of representa-
tion, and the concrete space of location, related in your work? Are the 
metaphorical and the physical meanings conflated, or separate? How are 
they articulated? In order to illustrate my question, let me take two examples 
that I have encountered in my sociological work in the French context. 
One is that of prostitution, or sex-work. The politics of this polemic, at least 
in France, focus on public spaces, if not public squares. The issue is visibility. 
No one is claiming to fight against sex work that takes place in private 
spaces, either in homes or businesses; the problem is street prostitution – and 
in particular the fact that these women congregate publicly in order to avoid 
the perils of isolation (men are left out of the discussion). In the public 
sphere, the whole heated debate turns around public spaces. At the same 
time, these “femmes publiques” (the old word) do not have a voice in the 
public sphere. They are spoken of; but they are never heard. Their physical 
assembly does not give them a representative presence.
The second example is that of the so-called Islamic veil. It is also a question 
of visibility in more ways than one. First, women wearing a veil are accused 
of trying to escape visibility; public visibility is then understood as an essen-
tial component of democratic participation. The justifications for the 2010 
law against the integral veil focused on this type of argument. But second, it 
is their visibility (as much as their invisibility) that is considered problem-
atic: the 2004 law rejected “ostentatious” religious signs in schools. How-
ever, the meaning of “public” changed from 2004 to 2010, from public schools 
to public spaces: while girls leaving secular schools can put their veil back 
on, women wearing an integral veil have to take it off if they want to go into 
streets. But in both cases, just like sex workers, veiled women are spoken of, 
but not heard from in the public polemic that concerns them most.
So, again, is this distinction of any use in your own work? And if so, what is 
the work that this distinction can do for the purposes of “a performative 
theory of assembly”?
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Daša Duhaček 
(Faculty of Political Sciences, Center for Gender and Politics, University of Belgrade)gordana.
duhacek@fpn.bg.ac.rs
Judging (for) the assembly: a commentary on Judith Butler, 
Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly
Judith Butler’s recent book, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 
opens up myriad important questions. This short commentary will focus on 
the possibility of – once again – using Arendt and feminist interpretations 
of her theory. I will resist the temptation to go into any of the other direc-
tions – such as exploring gender which is, in this book, an excellent sum-
mation of a long-term engagement Butler has invested in tackling gender 
trouble/s (Butler 1990, Butler 2004).  The tone of this book may come across 
as “resisting,” or “refusing” Arendt and, in each particular argument, quite 
rightly so (Butler 2015: 60, 75). However, I think there are some possibilities 
in the way Arendt’s political theory may still be further explored; and these 
possibilities are very much in the context of the questions raised here.
One of the points of departure in the book may be called “responsibilization” 
wrestled from under “neoliberalism, and renewed versions of political and 
economic individualism” (Butler 2015:14-15). The category of responsibil-
ity is also Arendt’s focus, addressed as personal responsibility (Arendt 2003), 
but also, significantly, as collective responsibility (Arendt 2003), which in 
her theory has become an emphatically political category. This concept of 
collective responsibility in Arendt’s theory corresponds to Butler’s focus on 
acting in concert, or plural performativity, etc.
Action in Arendt’s theory is a privileged category, however performed only 
in public, and, as Butler reminds us often, notoriously absent from the private 
sphere (Butler 2015: 44). Even if the issue has to some extent been resolved 
(Honig 1992) it is always important to address it, especially concerning the 
legitimate proposal of bridging this gap between private and public, important 
for feminist political theory (Butler 2015: 76).
Butler mentions other gaps/binaries, considering them to be sharply divisive 
and hence problematic if transposed from Arendt’s political theory and 
deployed, as such, in contemporary issues of building the concept of the 
political, notably the “distinction between body and mind” (Butler 2015: 
45), or the problem of separating (the life of) the body from the life of the 
mind (Butler 2015: 203, 205) or, in Arendt’s terms, thinking from acting. 
Butler resolves the public /private gap picturesquely naming it as a “passage 
from private to public” by arguing that “the public is essentially dependent 
on the private” (Butler 2015: 205). Moreover, she convincingly claims that 
the “private is not opposed to the political, but enters into its very definition 
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(…) private sphere becomes the very background of public action.” (Butler 
2015: 205). However, the other binary – mind versus body – equally critical 
for the political, can benefit from further deploying Arendt’s theory.  
In that context, my question concerns the possibility of using the Arendtian 
approach to judgment as a possible link to bridging the above mentioned 
gap (notwithstanding some of the arguments to the contrary, see Villa 1999). 
By focusing on the body (and juxtaposing it to the Arendtian concept of the 
mind), Butler appears to highlight this as a critical opposition. On the other 
hand, while the Arendtian body is laboring, working and finally, according 
to Butler, also acting politically (Arendt, 1958), it should be noted that the 
Arendtian mind is thinking, willing and ultimately judging (Arendt 1977).2 
As is well known, it is the category of judgment which, albeit not finally 
explicated in Arendt’s theory, is designated as an eminently political cate-
gory (Arendt 1989). Consequently, it is my argument that Butler’s analysis 
of the acting in concert, renewed in her interpretation of responsibilization, 
can benefit from an expansion into the inquiry of judgment. 
Butler already addressed the problem of judgment in some of her previous 
work (Butler 2012), but the category of judgment in the text Parting Ways 
is understood as a result, the aim of a process. Judgment is addressed 
within Levinas’ and Benjamin’s concept of judgment and, of course refers 
to Kantian aesthetic judgment. However, there are some restrictions in 
presenting this concept since here it pertains to the judgment as a court 
decision (Butler 2012: 132) or, the “final judgment”, even the “Last Judge-
ment” (Butler, 2012:95). As significant as these points in understanding 
judgment are, it is Butler’s study of the assembly where judgment, as a 
bounded concept, will not suffice and cannot be productively analyzed as 
finite.  The many guises of assembly that Butler considers, such as protests, 
gatherings, vigils, even funerals, where concerted action is taking place, are 
forms of political engagement which require the analysis of the processes 
of judging. Perhaps, these dynamics can then contribute even to redefining 
the concept of the political. On the other hand, as noted, Arendt has indi-
cated and opened up the issue of judgment. Without going into the countless 
interpretations of the category of judgment which dovetailed the original 
unfulfilled promise of the last part of The Life of the Mind (e.g. Beiner 1989) 
let us place it on the theoretical and political agenda once again. 
Here is where Linda Zerilli has seriously moved the debate forward which is 
why her analyses are relevant in feminist theory (Zerilli 2005, Zerilli 2009, 
Zerilli 2011). Devoting a series of texts to unfolding the category of judgment, 
2  Arendt’s last work, Life of the Mind consists of two parts, Thinking and Willing. The 
third part was to be on Judging, but it was never written. Arendt, Hannah (1977) Life 
of the Mind. San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company.
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she clarifies relevant issues (plurality, validity, imagination, etc.). Contrary 
to the prevailing interpretations of judgment, which perceive it as a cognitive 
closure, Linda Zerilli explicates why validity, as an epistemological criterion, 
cannot be the only politically relevant parameter. Therefore, in the matters 
of assembly or concerted action the ramifications of judgment regarding 
sustaining plurality, or building a community become evident since “the 
practice of political judgment is a way of constructing or discovering com-
munity through articulation of individuality…for this articulation will always 
involve taking the perspective of others into account.” (Zerilli 2005: 159). 
However, it must also be taken into account that “[j]udgment is a way of 
constructing and discovering (the limits of) community,” (Ibid. emphasis 
added) and, we may add, judging becomes irreplaceable in negotiating most 
issues of acceptance and inclusion into the public sphere. When claiming that 
“to be precluded from the space of appearance...” Butler also notes this is an 
exclusion from plurality (Butler 2015: 59). And plurality is the condition of 
(political) action – “the conditio per quam – of all political life” (Arendt 1958: 
7). This again calls for the analysis predicated on the category of judgment. 
Just to illustrate some of the complexities which may need to be addressed 
in this context, for example, Butler asks: “[t]he sphere of politics …is one in 
which there are always more than two subjects at play on the scene. (…) To 
which Other do I respond ethically? Which Other do I put before myself? Or 
do I stand by?” (Butler 2004: 139-140)
To return to the gap which Butler underscores in Arendt’s political theory, 
namely the one between the body and the mind. Zerilli appears to resolve 
the problem by privileging the position of the spectator in the ongoing de-
bate: actor versus spectator. Spectator “sees the play as a whole.” More im-
portantly, Zerilli draws attention to what Arendt clarifies as a politically 
pivotal position: “the judgment of the spectator creates the space …the pub-
lic realm” which is “constituted by the spectators, not by actors” (Arendt 
1989: 63). But, she expands and clarifies her claim, “this spectator sits in 
every actor” (Ibid.). Linda Zerilli highlights the significance of this positioning 
of the actor and the spectator. “This shift in emphasis amounts to a Coper-
nican turn in the relationship of action to judgment: without the judging 
spectators…action would have no meaning…” Judgment is the faculty which 
“allows us to order or make sense of our experience (…) gives coherence 
and meaning” (Zerilli 2005: 160). Nonetheless, questions regarding inter-
pretations of judgment do remain.
In order to underscore this, the claim that the point is in securing the condi-
tions of the process rather than aiming for the result as the criterion “Arendt 
emphasizes judging as an activity, not judgment as the result of an activity…
What we affirm in a political judgment is experienced not as a cognitive 
commitment, but as pleasure, as shared sensitivity. ‘We feel our freedom’ 
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What gives us pleasure is how we judge…in freedom” (Zerilli 2005: 183). This 
is the process of construction, building the political community. 
In her book on the Performative Theory of Assembly Butler develops a strong 
case in defense of the Arendtian argument of the right to have rights, which 
she translates into a current political issue of recognizing the urgency of the 
right to assembly and protest. This can further be unfolded in building a 
passage between spectator and actor, perhaps even discovering that there 
is no gap between mind and body – not even in Arendt’s theory – just the 
unfolding of the complexities of judging processes. These intricacies can 
only multiply in all the pathways which lead from ‘I’ to ‘we’, and spill over 
into the public square of concerted political action.
Erzsébet Barát 
(Department of English Studies, University of Szeged & Department 
of Gender Studies, Central European University, Budapest)
For embedded distinctions of precarity and identity
For this round table, I have decided to reflect in detail on the first chapter 
of Precarious Life, as it is this chapter that speaks most to my scholarly field, 
namely social linguistics, and to my interest in studying the relationship 
between language use, power and ideology. In addition, this is the text I can 
contextualize in Judith Butler’s works in queer theory that develop a discur-
sive approach to gender, some of which I have translated into Hungarian. 
The chapter brings me closest to my interest in and concern about the validity 
of the category of ‘identity’ (Barát 2011, 2015). Therefore, I would like my 
contribution to focus on the differentiation that in my reading Judith Butler 
draws between a politics of precarity as something that is more promising 
for collective political acts of justice vis-a-vis identity politics.
In my understanding, Butler sets out to argue that on occasions of occupa-
tions of public spaces by bodies that are deemed disposable, people come 
together to demand a livable life and, as a corollary to that, a grievable death. 
They demand the very right to appear and thereby say ‘We are still here.’ 
They do not have on these occasions a list of specific demands concerning 
a particular vision of how to make their life more just, more livable because, 
I gather, such an articulation of actual demands would run the risk of engag-
ing in identity politics. At the same time, there is also the assumption that 
making the precarity of life intelligible is not about willing away our onto-
logical vulnerability to others but about making precarity function as a site 
of intervention to keep fear and anxiety from turning into murderous action, 
while identity is seen as an inherently normative and normalizing category 
of (legitimization of) exclusion. Precarity would allow for a broader, by 
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implication non-exclusionary, understanding of ‘demands’. However, it is 
not so much a matter of scale as the reference to a broader/narrower scope 
should imply. This inclusiveness is made possible, paradoxically, by the fact 
that the category of precarity is conceptualized to allow for imagining shar-
ing the demand of livable life in public spaces in the form of a political act 
of plural performativity. Sharing then comes to be precluded in the case of 
political acts by mobilizations around ’identity’ that is said to operate through 
the production and maintenance of normative conceptions of belonging. To 
me, this distinction seems to produce a binary between a sharing that is 
associated with a universally imagined human condition over and against 
the articulations of particular demands. My reflections start precisely with 
how to understand this plurality as the condition of an inclusionary progres-
sive political act that should not hinge on the viability of this binary divide. 
If we accept the ontological premise that utterances (for their intelligibility) 
are structured by plurality, or multiplicity, that is the meaning of any cate-
gory, including identity as well as precarity, is by definition polyvocal or 
dialogic in Bakhtin’s (1975/1982) sense of the term, then all categories are 
informed by this multiple logic. Plurality is integral to all categories as a 
logical contingency. Consequently, the identity of the ‘I’ or ‘us’ is always 
already called into question in and by its differential modes of relating to 
others. Then the task to address to me is not that much to argue that iden-
tity as a category should necessarily fail to furnish what it means to live and 
act ethically together while precarity could deliver this by way of its neces-
sary orientation to inclusion but rather to explore the genealogy of the 
categories themselves; to see whether the current historic conditions of 
social struggle are more favorable towards an understanding of, or prefer-
ence for, precarity over identity. Maybe, what we should study is the reasons 
for ‘precarity’ to seem more of a promising category in contemporary po-
litical thought. Is the concept of precarity more productive because it has 
not become sedimented in the same way or to the same level of ‘obviousness’ 
as ‘identity’ has either in academic or in non-academic discourses of progres-
sive politics to evoke people as a group of belonging.
I believe seeing plurality as a structuring principle of all categories also 
entails the need to differentiate between arbitrariness and contingency, 
between the openness of a category as a matter of logical, epistemological 
likelihood and that of deontic binding of actual political relations of power 
that are to set a limit to the potential, logical plurality of signification. In my 
opinion, it is the paradigm of flexibility embedded within a particular po-
litical context of contingency that may explain why we should like to invest 
in the mobilizing potential of ‘precarity’ over ‘identity’ now and not some 
inherently understood exclusion/inclusion divide. I have come to this un-
derstanding on the basis of Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter; more spe-
cifically its chapter entitled “Critically Queer.” Her concern in that closing 
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chapter is with the temporality of the term. She sets out to explain the change 
of the meaning of the term from stigma to an affirmative set of meanings, 
from working as the mundane means of discursive regulation of the bound-
aries of legitimate sexuality to the successful resignification of desire as 
liminality (Butler 1993: 230).
In light of her argument there, I would say that our task is now to see 
whether we can argue for the need to overcome the constitutive history of 
injury articulated by interpellations through identity categories under the 
current particular conditions, such as the US practice of indefinite detentions 
in war camps. Our analyses then need to explore if and how identity indeed 
cannot be seen as a useful category of analysis for such political activism as 
‘precarity’; if that is the case because identity has been centralized too much, 
even in political movements that self-identity as progressive, to the point of 
articulating itself as “the obvious center” of political movements for social 
justice. Within such a historically contingent frame, we do not need to exclude 
‘identity’ as inherently normative and take precarity as necessarily of more 
critical and organizing potential any longer. Even if what is at stake in con-
temporary political movements of occupation of public spaces is negotiating 
what counts as livable and grievable life, it is not obvious that it should be 
seen to be more effective through precarity because the latter is not a cat-
egory that could yield an act of identification. As a linguist, I would say that 
within the contemporary political economy of signification, part of the at-
traction of precarity may lie with its more intensified orientation to encoding 
activities and so it can be more easily associated with transformation while 
identity is more readily anchored in nominalization and hence seen as ori-
ented to static, non-dynamic states of being and hence to rigid dispositions 
in political negotiations. This orientation to nominalization can contribute 
to rendering ‘identity’ as if “the” category of mediating the meaning of 
autonomous sociality abstracted away from any actual performances of 
embodiment that are much more readily available for the grammatical 
categories of verbs that are associated with precarious embodiments.
Judith Butler
Responses to Jelena Vasiljević, Éric Fassin, 
Daša Duhaček, Erzsébet Barát
First of all, Jelena, I appreciated very much your remarks, they could in fact 
develop into enormously robust criticisms in time, so I hope you go on to 
read other books as well. Just kidding. There are many important issues here. 
I take it that the pessimistic view that you are offering is one that suspects 
that, in fact, precarity has become increasingly random and that it affects 
people in increasingly random ways that cannot be patterned and predictable. 
And you suggest that perhaps we are not living in a situation of an unequal 
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distribution of vulnerability, but we actually are experiencing randomly in-
duced vulnerability or even an emerging homogenization of vulnerablity. So 
I would just say this: I think there is an interesting debate going on having 
to do with Thomas Piketty’s work, suggesting that in fact we can chart and 
track accelerating inequalities at the economic level and that wealth is being 
accumulated by fewer and fewer people at a greater rate, and poverty is be-
ing expanded at an accelerated rate, and including more and more people. 
One question is this: for those who might understand themselves as middle-
class, or who believed that going to school and getting a job might safeguard 
them from precarity, they are finding that the jobs they are getting are tem-
porary or the debts they are accruing cannot be paid off even with a full 
salary. So, to be salaried is not enough to safeguard against the prospect of 
unpayable debt. I do not want to be too economistic about this – I am not an 
economistic mind – but I do think that the Piketty argument is an interesting 
one, because from the perspective of that group which is trying to ascend to 
the middle class, or which understands itself as functioning within the mid-
dle class presumption – only to find that they lost this job, or that that job 
does not work, or the salary is not ok, or I cannot get a house, or I cannot do 
anything that was part of the traditional promise of middle class employed 
life – from that group’s perspective it does feel random, it can be registered 
as random. Why did I have this job and suddenly I do not? That is random. 
Why did I get this salary only to find that I cannot pay my rent with that sal-
ary? It is random at a certain level because patterns that we expect to replicate 
themselves are breaking down, but it may be that those random patterns can 
be thought about in terms of Piketty’s understanding of economic inequality 
as an effect of randomness that actually belongs to this unfortunately pat-
terned way in which economic inequality is increasing in an unfortunately 
predictable – not totally predictable, but trackable – way. (Jelena Vasiljević 
makes a short intervention to clarify her point)
Right. But would we not protest it if we saw it as not only unequally dis-
tributed but increasingly unequally distributed? In other words, I think there 
is an analysis that could perhaps produce a better informed protest. But 
thank you, I think this is really helpful to think about. I completely agree 
with you that infrastructure can support inequality. That was the problem 
with apartheid; it was the problem with slavery and the caste system, as you 
pointed out. And though I make use of Gandhi occasionally, I am not in any 
way committed to all of Gandhi’s views. I do not accept his views on caste, 
I do not accept his views on women or, indeed, on passivity. No. So, if aboli-
tion of the caste system destroys the infrastructure, is that a bad thing? No, 
it strikes me as a revolution. And sometimes infrastructures need to be de-
stroyed, or brought to a halt, in order for something revolutionary to take 
place. That is perhaps one of the key meanings of the general strike. Maybe 
the category that is missing from this book is revolution. 
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Eric, I appreciate very much your once again letting us imagine L’Assemblée 
nationale trapped in the Jeu de Paume. Really, amazing. Maybe we should 
make distinctions here in Arendt’s work: Espace publique; the space of ap-
pearance and the space of politics. Of course, it becomes confusing because 
Arendt maintains a distinction between the private and the public and, at 
least in The Human Condition, it would seem that it is the public sphere which 
is the presumptive space of politics. And yet, as she describes the space of 
politics we realize that it is effectively disjoined from any particular architec-
ture or infrastructure. It does not have to take place in the square, it does not 
have to be an already established public space. It actually comes into being 
wherever and whenever a group of people get together and act in concert. 
So that is the literal plural performativity of her view. We get together and 
act in concert, and we could be in the Jeu de Paume or we could be in a 
railway station, or we can be in a street or at the border, or any number of 
places. Insofar as we act together we produce a space of politics which reart-
iculates the public in a new way, outside of any established or recognizable 
public space. That seems interesting – of course, I love that idea of hers, it is 
beautiful, it is romantic, I wish it were true, and perhaps it is true in part, for 
we do not know in advance what will become a space of appearance. But in 
fact, I worry about her transcendence of the material conditions of acting, 
the question of support, the question of architecture and infrastructure. So 
that is where I try to re-ground her or at least point out that action always 
needs support. All action needs support, including plural action (plurality 
alone is not sufficient support). It does not need to be a recognized public 
space that would be the support – I think that would be a kind of Bourdieu 
argument, namely, that already existing convention alone supports effective 
action. But still, there must be some kind of structuring of space for that to 
take place even as it can be significantly restructured in and by the action.
The question you raise about “prostitution” is an interesting one. Should 
prostitutes – should sex workers, as some of us would prefer to call them – 
remain invisible, should they remain unrepresented, or should they be in 
fact visible, an acknowledged part of public life, and represented by unions 
and institutions that will make sure that they work safely and with proper 
pensions? I am in favor of that second view. I guess I wanted to point out 
that, at least in France, the question of what is permissible in a public space 
is confused, as you yourself pointed out with the wonderful example of the 
woman who leaves school without the niqab and then puts it on to go home 
and so loses respect and standing in the public sphere, since veiled women 
are not considered to be political subjects in their own right. I recently 
saw under conditions of l’état d’urgence, news programs were interviewing 
the neighbors in Saint-Denis where the most suicide bombing occurred 
and where those responsible for the attacks were living. And this woman 
(a neighbor) was in a full-face veil, and she was giving an interview on 
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the television show. And they wanted her information; they did not say you 
couldn’t appear like this on a television show. And they did not presume she 
was, because veiled, utterly mute. They let her appear, perhaps by accident, 
she had a perfectly interesting set of remarks to make about the people who 
were living there and how much she did not like them. It caused a brief 
debate in public discourse: should she not have been interviewed? Should 
that face not have been broadcast? Well, she is a neighbor, she had things 
to say, and someone thought: let us forget about the niqab, let us hear what 
this woman has to say. I enjoyed that little transgression, it seemed there 
are many inconsistencies on how public space is regulated. Perhaps by 
accident, she was rightly treated as a citizen at that moment.
Daša, thank you for your remarks on Hannah Arendt, I really believe that 
the central question of what concept of judgment should concerted action 
rely upon is an excellent question. I do not have a clear answer to it, but 
I would be most interested in trying to think through Arendt’s writings on 
reflective judgment and aesthetic judgment in Kant in relationship to con-
certed action. If we could put those different strains of Hannah Arendt 
together it would be quite amazing. My worry has always been that the one 
who judges is a more or less free, spontaneous, sovereign, reasonable creature. 
And that is not a “we”, that is not a “plural we” who is exercising judgment 
(or that the “plural we” is sometimes modeled on sovereignty). Especially 
in Arendt’s work on civil disobedience, or when she writes about moral 
responsibility under dictatorship, then we really are holding individuals 
responsible for not simply saying, “I refuse to follow the laws of the Nazi 
regime”. They fail in matters of personal individual judgment. But to think 
judgment in relationship to plurality and to concerted action, I think she did 
not do it. Perhaps I am wrong, but I think it is left to us to do it really. She 
seems to be the person who has gone as far as possible in that way, and 
I would be willing to be led and illuminated. So, thank you very much. 
Zsazsa, I do not know whether you were suggesting that one reason I prefer 
precarity over identity is that precarity allows me to think about livability 
whereas identity would compel me to think about justice. Was that the point 
you were making? Well, I would certainly want to talk about justice, but 
I guess what eludes me is why it is that identity is the link to justice. I do not 
see an immediate link. Maybe I am missing something terribly obvious. It 
seems to me that there are all kinds of ways of asking for justice. We can ask 
for the just distribution of wealth, we can ask for legal justice in relationship 
to atrocities committed, we can ask for a just society in which laws and 
political organization are open and transparent. I am not sure how any of 
those particular versions of justice would rely on identity. Sometimes identity 
claims are about wanting to be recognized. Identity seems more related to 
the question of recognition than to justice, but maybe there is a link there 
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that I am not seeing. But I would hope that I would be able to account for 
demands for justice, as I hope I would be able to account for judgment as a 
kind of plural action. Although it is not what I do here, and that may well 
be a limitation of this book.
I very much appreciate your other point, which is that all identity categories 
are multiply created, multiply determined, which means that they are not 
as identitarian as we might think. So I appreciate that very much: that is a 
very good point. However, your last intervention – that the term precarity 
has not been sedimented in political discourse as much as identity, and in 
that sense it is not yet fully determined, or it provides more openness – is 
interesting. I think that Petar and some others are going to suggest that 
precarity is embedded in fact in forms of paternalism, which I am going to 
wait to respond to. But let me simply say this: I am not choosing to focus on 
the term precarity for arbitrary reasons. I am noticing, of course, that there 
are mobilizations in and around precarity and that this has been a term that 
I understand to be developed to supplement the idea of the proletariat. The 
proletariat is a group of exploited workers, and it seems to me that the pre-
cariat go in and out of work, they cannot even necessarily be understood 
primarily as workers because the status of worker is not fully available to 
them, given the way in which employment has become temporary, or con-
tingent, or retractable. It is not possible to become constituted as proletariat 
political subject with the same consistency and durability. So, I am trying 
to follow these mobilizations, and if that’s “precarity” proves not to be the 
most important political signifier, that is ok. I do not think that it has to be 
one term around which people mobilize. I think there are a number of such 
terms, maybe I would say a family resemblance of signifiers that we might 
be able to collect and think about as mobilizing, having a certain mobilizing 
force of holding out an aspirational possibility. We will come back to this 
once paternalism enters the scene.
Petar Bojanić 
(IFDT, University of Belgrade)
bojanic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs
In my brief remarks, I will try to be as concise as possible. I will try to prob-
lematize what I have read last few days in this book and in Judith Butler’s 
lecture, keeping in mind that I have not been able to, for example, look into 
the functioning of vulnerabilité in Levinas (and how Butler reads him). What 
interests me most of all is what holds us together, what keeps us bound, 
what allows for living or acting together. (And there are myriad responses 
to this question – are we held together by money, interest, crime, collective 
killing, collective intentionality? Is there group or collective consciousness, 
etc.? Also, I am of course interested, along with many others, whether it is 
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really possible to find a different common action beyond the corporation or 
company?) Further, I wonder, are we really held together by these two 
protocols, vulnerability and precarity? If you look at the titles of interviews 
conducted with Butler in Argentina and Brazil from June of this year, you 
will notice an international of those in precarità or precarité or in “precarity” 
(“Somos todos potencialmente precàrion;” “alianca entre os precàrions;” a 
word which functions entirely differently in Romance languages). 
The question from the chapter “Precarious Life and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” 
“What is the relation between precarity and vulnerability?” (109) but also 
Butler’s awareness that there is “the risk of using the term ‘vulnerability’,” 
“There is of course an even more sinister way of wielding both categories of 
precarity and of vulnerability” (143), her various hesitations, etc. – all center 
in Butler’s project to gently modify Hannah Arendt (“I would suggest, when 
vulnerability is itself mobilized, not as an individual strategy, but in concert” 
and “to think vulnerability and agency together” [139], or else “to mobilize 
vulnerability in concert” [140], as well as “mobilizing precarity,” “to show us 
the simultaneity of being precarious and acting”). The biggest problem, it 
seems to me, from the lecture on Vulnerability/Resistance and from the book 
is constructed around paternalistic power. “A most important criticism,” says 
Butler, “emerges from those who argue that vulnerability cannot be the basis 
for group identification without strengthening paternalistic power.” This is 
followed by Butler’s attempt to improvise a swift and effective response. My 
question is how is it possible a priori to cleanse vulnerability or precarity of 
paternalistic histories when they are its integrative part? 
Let me elaborate: the moment of resistance, apart from the group or “mobi-
lizing precarity,” necessarily implies the existence of a strong instance of 
sovereignty. This could be easily shown through a legal history of “precari-
ousness protocol,” which sums up the entire political theology of the Western 
world and Christianity. The word precarity or précaire appears for the first 
time in the 16th century (Levinas, I recall, uses the phrase “ontological precar-
ity” [la précarité ontologique] saying that the face is “precarity more precari-
ous than all precarity” [précarité plus précaire que toute précarité]). It comes 
from Latin legal jargon, precarius, and means “obtained by praying” (prex). 
Surprisingly, this origin is at once juridical and religious (or pseudo-religious). 
This etymology would indicate that all precarity is synonymous with de-
pendence on a curatorial power, regardless of its precise nature, which could 
give us what we ask, or refuse our request, or even withdraw it from us at 
any moment after having given it – whence the idea that anything precarious 
is poorly established and secured. However, this etymology also at once 
signals that human precarity is not exclusively a contemporary issue, nor 
indeed a recent one. By definition, there is precarity wherever there is 
power. To reiterate: “precarity” exists in a place where: (1) there is power 
that can be solicited (asked, begged) for something (usually land or some 
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such benefit), (2) something has been lent or borrowed without a contract 
(a transaction that is not a legal act [acte juridique], not an obligation, but a 
simple fact), (3) it is not a lending or borrowing with a specific date of return 
(commodatum), but the owner decides on their own when the precarious 
[précariste] must return the land (this is called precarium; in Naples, in 1772, 
Giambatisto Vico writes in the margin of his book Il diritto universale about 
the precarium as the origin of the contract; a hundred years prior, Hugo 
Grotius writes about Jews to whom the Roman emperor allowed the conduct 
of public ritual and the following of their own laws based on jus precarium, 
and not on the laws of the empire (non ex lege aliqua imperio addità). Meaning, 
that he could have abolished them whenever he so wished.
It seems entirely clear to me, then, why Abraham insists on purchasing the 
land on which to bury Sarah, and not accept it as a “gift,” and why, on the 
other hand, the various 17th century converts, who abandon Judaism, think 
that precarity is a sign of malediction [la précarité est signe de malédiction]. 
Conversely, a good example that could also be thematized is as follows. If 
the great legacy of the French revolution was to make all work of limited 
duration in order to prevent the risk of slavery and servitude (since, as we 
know, there were no contracts of unlimited duration until the end of the 19th 
century), or if people have consciously accepted precarity as a common 
resistance to becoming individually subjugated, it is uncertain whether in-
equality is thus reduced or even if the master or sovereign is thus lesser. 
Assuming that the goal of resistance is to bring more justice, might we ask, 
does justice reduce vulnerability? Thank you very much.
Katarina Lončarević 
(Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade)
katarina.loncarevic@fpn.bg.ac.rs
Since I have only five minutes, I cannot discuss all the important topics 
Judith Butler explores in her new book. But I must say that all the issues 
raised in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly are important for 
us today, for our lives and our struggles against injustice and inequalities 
we face. First, as a feminist, I must say that this book is very important from 
a feminist perspective, because almost all the problems you discuss are 
problems that feminists explore: from subversion of the dichotomy between 
traditionally political and nonpolitical sphere, over the analysis of the con-
cept of the individual, to relationship between “I” and “We” and discussion 
of possibility of joint political action… However, in these few minutes I would 
like to say something about the concept of vulnerability as one of the crucial 
concepts analyzed in the book. It is a very important concept for feminism 
as well, and as you say in chapter four (“Bodily Vulnerability and Coalition 
Politics”) “feminist theorists have for a long time argued that women suffer 
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social vulnerability disproportionately” (Butler 2015: 140). You recognize 
in the book and you said yesterday during the lecture something about the 
dangers of understanding that “women have an unchanging and defining 
vulnerability” (Ibid), because it leads to asking a “paternal authority for 
special … protections”, and at the very same time “affirms that inequality 
of power that situates women in a powerless position” (Ibid: 141). So, I agree 
with you that vulnerability is not totally active or passive, and that vulner-
ability and resistance can and do happen at the same time, and we can see 
that in different feminist claims. 
I am going to use the opportunity that you are here today among us to ask a 
question about something that is absent from the new book (although not 
from your previous work), but it is close to you and your work, namely 
I would like to hear a little bit more about the concept of vulnerability pre-
sented in the theory of your colleague and friend Bracha Ettinger among 
others. Ettinger’s work is not unknown to the wider audience, because she 
was in Belgrade last year as the keynote speaker at the Summer School for 
Sexualities, Cultures and Politics, organized by our colleague Jelisaveta 
Blagojević on behalf of Ipak Center and Faculty of Media and Communications. 
The concept of vulnerability is one of the crucial concepts in your recent 
work (not only in this book) as well as in Ettinger’s work (and not only hers; 
I am using her as an example of a different position from yours). Ettinger 
and you are inspired by, but also very critical of two authors: Arendt and 
Levinas. And both you and Ettinger conceptualize vulnerability in a similar, 
yet different way, in part due to different theoretical frameworks, which, 
I believe, can nevertheless communicate with each other. For both of you, 
the body that is vulnerable is a crucial point, the body is always already 
vulnerable and it is important to recognize the same vulnerability (or po-
tential for vulnerability) of the other. For both of you interdependency is 
important, although you two do not use the same terminology when speaking 
about interdependency, but for both the subject is never alone, never isolated, 
and always dependent on the others.
I believe that the crucial points of disagreement are, first, Ettinger’s invitation 
to return to transubjective precondition of subjectivization (trans-subjectivity 
for Ettinger is co-emergence of I and non-I). And second, while both of you 
speak about vulnerability of the subject, of the body, Ettinger claims the 
recognition of the vulnerability of the other and self-fragilization as a chosen 
position (she believes that self-fragilization is the position upon which you 
can act because one chooses to self-fragilize in an encounter with the other) 
(Ettinger 2006a; 2006b; 2011).
From this point, it seems to me that the differences in your and Ettinger’s 
account of vulnerability can have different ethical and political conse-
quences. And despite the fact that your account of vulnerability is much 
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closer to the account of vulnerability I would embrace, I am asking you to 
explain, from your point of view, differences between these accounts of 
vulnerability, especially because you are reluctant to accept self-fragilization 
as a chosen position.
Brigita Miloš 
(Department of Cultural Studies, Faculty for Humanities, University of Rijeka)
bmilos@ffri.hr
Movements and the Balkans
Judith Butler’s latest book, Notes towards a Performative Theory of Assembly 
was published at approximately the same time as the (European) public 
acknowledgement of the so-called refugee crisis, i.e. the mass arrival of 
people mostly from the Middle East (but also Africa) to Europe. The motivations 
behind their emigration are different (war in Syria, political or economic 
deprivation in Afghanistan, Sudan etc.), but their goal is the same – to reach 
one of Western Europe’s developed countries. A significant part of this moving 
population passes through the geographical region of the Balkans, and it 
did not take long for the media to coin the name “The Balkan Route” (in-
terestingly enough, there has never been “The Italian Route” regardless of 
the fact that Italy has in the last couple of years been the principle entry 
point onto European ground). 
The term ‘route’ evokes the notions of passing through, of mobility or move-
ment. Butler writes: “Mobility is itself a right of the body, but it is also a 
precondition for the exercise of other rights, including the right of assembly 
itself” (Butler 2015: 138). It is exactly this dual nature of mobility/movement 
that seem especially plausible in the context of the “newcomers” passing 
through the Balkans. 
People arriving in Europe – migrants, immigrants, refugees, expatriates, 
emigrants, exiles – share the notion of precarity with the people mentioned 
as examples of assembled action in Butler’s book, as well as vulnerability to 
a great extent. This is especially the case, I believe, due to their absolute 
exposure to others. They move towards and through the Balkans in ac-
cordance with one another, as well as with all the possible support they are 
able to get, often not official, or legal, usually overtly criminal. (What would 
be the right way to update Agamben’s notion of police and humanitarians 
as being the only instances of dealing with the refugees’ needs?)
I am not sure, though, whether it is possible to call their ‘movements’ con-
certed in the same sense as the amassing of undocumented workers, or the 
Occupy movement, or even of the refugee uprisings in refugee camps in 
demand for food, shelter or sanctuary. For it seems that in this particular 
case, the movements within the (refugee) camps differ from ‘bare mobility’ 
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or mobility as a precondition of the right to (political) movement in one 
small but important feature: there is no hint of anything that might point 
towards their engaging in a concerted (cl)aim to make a different societal 
surrounding in the Balkans, for example one that claims the (free) right of 
passage through the area. In other words, it seems that the Balkans is not 
recognized as a place good enough to make a claim for political visibility/
reality. The people who arrive do not intend to occupy the streets or squares 
of the Balkans in revolt because of things of which they are deprived. They 
actually want to pass through the Balkans, preferably as quickly as possible 
in order to reach a different place where, I suppose, they believe their life 
could become a livable one, or even a good one, regardless of the fact that 
practice often shows the opposite. The Balkan Route functions simply as a 
space of traversing, of momentariness; it figures as a space not shaped for 
claiming the right to (make a) movement, but one that could be utilized for 
many purposes with regards to demanding bodies in mobility – taking in-
ventories of life and death, young and old, refugees or immigrants, woman 
and man. Bio-bureaucratization is at the threshold of Europe and for the 
purposes of the systematic and regulated transition of bodies from un-
recognizable “bare life” to “rightless” or “already but not yet” recognized in 
rights, agencies or reality.
Is it the case that a “sedentary” situation of uprisings and demands in the 
(refugee) camps all over Europe exceeds in reality “nomadic” wandering 
through the Balkans? Butler writes: “Those who are excluded from existing 
polities, who belong to no nation-state or other contemporary state formation, 
may be deemed “unreal” only by those who seek to monopolize the terms of 
reality. And yet, even after the public sphere has been defined through their 
exclusion, they act. Whether they are abandoned to precarity or left to die 
through systemic negligence, concerted action still emerges from their acting 
together” (Butler 2015: 80-81). In a certain sense, the “newcomers” take over 
and pass through various areas that in many ways become “public”/politicized 
in a different ways than before, when their bodies were not appearing there 
– for example, the illegal crossing of green borders; pressure on opening the 
‘soft’ ones; and on the other hand putting up barbed wire or building walls 
along state borders… All of these situations are present and connected to the 
fact of passing through, or stopping for the moment of the gathered/arrived 
bodies. This is not an effect of a concerted action of a refugee uprising in 
demand for free passage, but more as a consequence of the (dis)orientation 
of the Balkan political establishment in a situation that shows clearly all the 
dimensions of the inconsistencies of the European political mainstream.
Would, then, the phrase “acting together” be applicable to the fact of an en 
masse arrival of people mostly from the Middle East to Europe? Or is it some 
other form of acting, some form that belongs to a state of affairs that are 
maybe ‘prepolitical’ or some other register of things we do not yet have the 
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language to describe? How should the public claim of those people, consisting 
of being able to live a livable life in the countries that rarely and occasionally 
recognize Middle Eastern lives as grievable, be thought of? 
And in connection to this, is the space/area of the Balkans (traditionally 
treated as an Other of Europe) possible as a space of concerted, public action 
that can bring about “radical democratic change?” Or is it the case that the 
Balkan “saturation in power relations” (Butler 2015: 80) reveals, traditionally 
again, clear-cut “dominant and subjugated forms” (Butler 2015: 80)? For it 
seems that the mere name Balkan Route functions as a performative act, 
which enacts shapes and situates assembled bodies aiming to traverse a 
specific space, as well as those destined to live in this very space. Especially 
regarding the fact that insecurity over the grievability of Balkan lives amounts 
to a certainty over understanding the Balkans as a space that is between 
(European) borderlines.
Judith Butler
Responses to Petar Bojanić, 
Katarina Lončarević and Brigita Miloš
I will try to be brief. These are all, of course, really excellent questions. I find 
myself surprised and pleased by every question I receive in Belgrade, I do 
not know why that is. It is not that I had a different expectation, it is that 
the form of engagement is extremely serious and thoughtful and respectful 
and there is nothing formulaic about it. So I cannot just occupy a role and… 
“oh, that question again,” which is what I am sometimes used to doing.
First of all, let us think a little bit about this extraordinary etymology of precar-
ity that Petar has offered us. I think there are at least two questions raised by 
the etymology. Is it possible to disjoin precarity from the paternalistic tradition 
from which it comes, and is it possible to disjoin precarity from the idea of an 
arbitrary sovereign, which is a very specific kind of paternalism? The figure 
of the arbitrary sovereign who decides when and where and whether the 
precarious must return the land, and in relation to whom the precarious are 
beseeching, begging. I want to suggest is that it is precisely this etymology 
that offers a certain kind of descriptive power. In other words, the term pre-
carity offers by virtue of this etymology a descriptive power for certain kinds 
of relations that we experience in the present. I think one could actually 
read this through the work of Giorgio Agamben in an interesting way, thinking 
about the precarious as bare life, or as a population subject to sovereign 
expulsion or containment or both. But what interests me about the etymology 
provided is that precarity exists where there is a power to whom the precarious 
makes its petition, and that relation is one of abasement; in other words, those 
who are precarious are in the position of living at the whim of a sovereign 
who is under no contractual obligation to engage the precarious in a just or 
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fair way. It is an importantly pre-legal condition of dependency and petition. 
The precarious have to formulate their petition and abase themselves before 
a power that may or may not countenance the request.
So why would such a term be brought forward to describe contemporary 
relations of labor and dispossession? Well, one reason is that labor contracts 
have become a thing of the past, that we are entering again into a situation 
where people are working without a contract, or long-term contracts are 
nullified, or short-term contracts have qualifications built into them that 
give the employer the possibility of ending the contract at will. So, we are 
seeing the destruction of labor unions and syndicalism in various parts of 
the world, and we also see the outsourcing of labor to countries where the 
regulation of labor practices are weak or nullified, so that labor can be ex-
ploited outside of recognizable conventions of contracting, outside of the 
reach of international labor law. It is that outsourcing of labor that has 
produced the contemporary situation of precarity both for those deprived 
of labor, and those employed under conditions in which contracts have been 
decimated. Now, Petar is right to point out that precarity is bound up with 
paternalism and with arbitrary sovereign power, but maybe what we are 
actually seeing is a re-entry of this idea of precarity into the contemporary 
world precisely on the grounds that the idea of reliable labor contracts and 
contractually guaranteed long-term employment have been nearly destroyed 
and we are now falling back into this pre-legal situation, or perhaps a pre-
modern form of legality. If so, then who are the arbitrary sovereigns of our 
contemporary scene? Well, they are corporations, they are sometimes uni-
versities that hire contingent faculty and abandon them before they have a 
chance to achieve security. But they are also financial institutions, and the 
way that finance has entered into the social organization of work. That is 
becoming an increasing norm where I live and where I visit. 
So it is a world of broken contracts and weakened or eviscerated labor unions 
and labor laws. The trans-national labor practices are now ones that can, and 
do, consistently break with internationally regulated labor laws and maybe 
this is what reanimates such a term from the past. Now, when you say that 
the sovereign or the figure of paternal power is integrated into the very 
concept, I do not know. I think we can trace that etymology and that gives 
us many related insights, and we can even say that that etymology illuminates 
the descriptive power of precarity in trying to describe the contemporary 
situation of those who are in and out of labor at the will of supervenient 
powers. However, to mobilize on the basis of that precarity, that is to say, to 
identify as the precarious or to oppose the condition of precarity is to reani-
mate the concept and the virtue of etymology against that etymology. I mean, 
anachronistic terms get reanimated for contemporary reasons and they be-
come redeployed for counter-purposes and the etymology cannot constrain 
those movements n advance. There is nothing about the etymology that can 
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stop that redeployment or reanimation from happening. I love etymologies 
but I am not that much of a Heideggerian that I think they finally control the 
semantic reach of the concept. It was Derrida who raised some of those 
critical questions about the presumptive power of etymology to control the 
semantic reach of the term, was it not? It was iterability that posed the pos-
sibility of a constitutive interruption and deviation of that signifying chain.
Bracha Ettinger’s work – yes – I engaged with in several essays, and she has 
engaged with mine, and she is responsible for alerting me to the importance 
of impressionability, what she calls primary impressions. And for her these 
are often psychic traces that cannot be consciously recuperated, but that leave 
their traces in the visual field in some way. I certainly have cited her before, 
and I have worked on her, I have written essays in her exhibition catalogues, 
and if I did not cite her in this book then that is just an oversight and I will 
correct it in the next edition. I worry that the idea of the matrixial in Ettinger’s 
work gives a kind of primacy to the figure of the mother, and I think that, for 
me, I accept that there is this primary, radically non-volitional dependency, 
but I am not sure we can call this support system, even for the infant – I am 
not sure we can call this entire support system maternal. After all, there is an 
entire adult and institutional world that makes its primary impingements on 
the infant. Now, she might understand me as somehow engaging a rejection 
of the mother. Of course, the mother, if there is mother, plays a very large role, 
but when the maternal becomes the name for the matrix that implies that a 
certain social form is identical with that structural function. The truth is that 
infants are brought into the world under all kinds of conditions, and we have 
to develop several names for those forms. Let us remember as well that mothers 
are also supported, hopefully, by institutions and laws and networks of relations. 
I do not want the maternal to be the name for that that entire problematic of 
support systems. How do we think about hospitals, how do we think about 
healthcare, how do we think about shelter, how do we think about citizenship 
– all those things are there as vital and necessary forms of support for creatures 
defined in part by their dependency on those supports. 
I accept that self-fragilization is an important strategy, if it is a strategy. It 
seems to me that fragility comes upon us non-volitionally, or that it is already 
there prior to any reflexive act of our own; I am not sure it can ever be fully 
marshaled by our deliberate efforts to form a strategy on the basis of that 
fragility. Perhaps fragility shares a family resemblance to vulnerability. 
I think that for Ettinger, self-fragilization becomes an important concept in 
a culture where military aggression and defensiveness have become the 
norm; there is an anti-military ethos in this idea of self-fragilization that I 
respect profoundly, and it is true that it probably would not be my term, but 
it does not mean I do not relate to it, or that I refute it. 
As to the refugee crisis, briefly, I would simply say it is interesting to think 
about when and where refugees do in fact gather – and they are of course 
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compelled to gather at borders that are closed. And in some cases, like Calais 
(before it was forcibly scattered), there are minor polities that emerge in 
the camp, in the refugee camp. Who is going to represent the refugees, who 
is going to devise the strategy, who is going to speak to the NGOs, who is 
going to talk to the security guards, who is going to try to stop the train, who 
is going to get on the train? So, there are informal assemblies, and there are 
some people who are trying to offer informed descriptions about how that 
happens. It is an interesting remark about the Balkans being a country to be 
passed through, but not a destination. Perhaps we have to understand the 
phantasmatic character of the Eurozone, and the tales that are transmitted 
over borders and languages about the safety or possibilities that wait at the 
end of the line. But even as the refugees pass through the Balkans, they 
enact rights of passage, and here I would just go back to the point I mentioned 
yesterday, which is that rights of mobility or capacity for mobility are prior 
to gathering, they are prior to assembly. There has to be an assembling from 
a state of dispersal before there can be an assembly. Although, people can 
assemble as well in motion, in transit, in media res. So, I think there are some 
ways that moving and acting together and even stitching together forms of 
support for chronic forms of abandonment are really crucial. We have all 
followed reports on the sharing of cell phones regarding bus schedules and 
transit routes, blocks, security guards, police, and deportation possibilities. 
It is very interesting to think about the networks of support that take place 
over cell phones, all of them suggest modes of acting, thinking and deliberating 
that are mediated within virtual frameworks of space and time. I think there 
is much more that can be thought about in relationship to those networks, 
how the virtual intersects with embodied life, both its constraints and its 
mobility. There may have to be many people moving for anyone to move, 
and yet the movement of the many is never a single movement. The cell 
phone involves a certain movement, but it is also a crucial technological 
dimension of mobility and the movement. 
Athena Athanasiou 
(Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens)
athenaathanasiou2@gmail.com
Your book, Judith, asks about the embodied and plural political performativ-
ity of public assembly, especially when freedom of assembly is coming under 
increasing assault, because the very public spaces of assembling and protest-
ing are dispossessed by capitalist forces of corporatization and privatization, 
forces of anti-immigrant securitization and the “constitutive exclusions” by 
which the body politic is established and are at work in the performative 
power of subject formation. In mobilising your unconditional concern with 
conditions and conditionality, you ask who “the people” may be, what counts 
as “public,” and how people come together even when the conditions for 
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their acting together have been devastated. “The people,” you write, “are 
produced by the conditions of possibility of their appearance.” At the same 
time, “ways of avowing and showing certain forms of interdependency stand 
a chance of transforming the field of appearance itself.” The conception of 
“the people” that you develop stands as a critique of both the managerial 
evisceration of political subjectivity and the conception of a total, unified, 
and exclusionary community forming always within existing borders.
Such a gesture allows the conception of “the people” to be critically displaced by 
those who have become rendered invisible and disposable: “those who cannot 
appear, who are constrained from appearing or who operate through virtual 
or digital networks” (8). The book implies a new and radical understanding of 
the public space of appearance essential to politics. I wonder, however, wheth-
er we might read Arendt with Foucault here: “space of appearance” as “trap of 
visibility.” How, in becoming present to one another and in coming together 
in transformative modes of survival and persistence, might we become dispos-
sessed by – and critically displace – the normative premises of “presence?”
One of the most important contributions that this book makes is that it in-
dicates ways in which, in the context of critical practices emerging despite 
and against current regimes of subordination, political subjectivity is not 
enacted as grounded in a pre-existing solid foundation of the (present) self, 
but rather as brought about through collective modes of subjectivation and 
critical de-subjugation – echoing your reading of Foucault’s “What Is Critique?” 
and your emphasis on de-subjugation. So I think the question of “appearance” 
might be fruitfully linked to the question of the specter, as the human whose 
humanity persists in spite of the forces that seek to expropriate its humanness. 
This is a figure that animates the conditions of im/possibility, which make 
performativity political. And it is crucial to the question of what happens 
when “we” come together as sans papier, queer, and unemployed: what 
happens to both the “we” and the “come-together.” I am motivated here by 
Achille Mbembe’s “The Well of Specters” and his analysis of the specter of 
the nègre. So what is spectral about the assembly? And how might it work to 
animate the assembly and unsettle the biopolitical matrix of subjectivation 
and de-subjugation? 
Public assemblies, which have become a defining characteristic of political 
action in this decade, embody not only the struggle in the street but also, 
significantly, the struggle for the street. The intimate connection between 
struggle in the street and for the street gains suggestive resonance as a way of 
reflecting and engaging with forms of political subjectivity that are – or seek 
to become – possible in these times of autarchic governmentality and increasing 
securitization. A question that emerges here is this: how would the conception 
of taking action as taking to the streets shift from the perspective of people in 
the boats in the Mediterranean? What claims to the infrastructural, affective, 
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and institutional conditions for livability are enacted by refugees and un-
documented migrants who pour over European borders or cross the Mediter-
ranean waterways in overcrowded fishing boats demanding the right of life? 
Throughout the book, you give these questions new possibility. With your 
insistence on the concerted actions of the body – in its becoming “at once 
concretely vulnerable, even breakable, and potentially and actively defiant, 
even revolutionary” – you perform for us this possibility.
The book offers us valuable ways to account for the possibility of non-sovereign 
political agency: a notion of agency that is not reducible to an antecedent 
sovereign self, self-willed intentionality and the standards of possessive indi-
vidualism. Instead, it remains immanent to power, socially involved and 
compromised, potent and vulnerable, contingent and indeterminate. Such 
“transient and critical gatherings” implicate the political and affective register 
of social relationality, freedom with others, questions of demarcated matrices 
of recognizability, as well as the gendered, sexual, racial, and economized 
implications of one’s bodily exposure to one another and to embedded power. 
The notion of non-volitional and non-individualistic agency reaches far back 
into your oeuvre. You now return to the theory of performativity, in extending 
its purview beyond speech acts to include embodied forms of coming together, 
in order to dwell on its transformative political implications and unravel them 
more specifically under conditions of precarity and neoliberal dispossession. 
Performativity does not just indicate how we come to act, but also how we are 
differentially affected by discursive and institutional power and how we are 
animated and moved with others and by others in relation to our common 
but differential precarity and in relation to making room for new forms of 
being beside oneself and being-together. The book asks how we might come 
to be asking the question about acting. It does so by taking us beyond satu-
rated, typical debates between Leninist “vanguardism” and late-Autonomist 
“spontaneity”, or those who seek vertical organization and others who under-
score the benefits of activist horizontality and the “commons.”  
The question then becomes: is the assembly a new political institution? Is it 
a provisional figure of struggle? Is it an embodied form of radical democracy? 
Does it seek to describe and build a post-party political formation that differs 
from or rejects a politics of representation? Understanding public assemblies 
as plural forms of performative action brings to the fore the question of how 
different this is from liberal pluralism. I think one possible answer is given 
in the book, when you write: “The point of a democratic politics is not simply 
to extend recognition equally to all of the people, but, rather, to grasp that 
only by changing the relation between the recognizable and unrecognizable 
can (a) equality be understood and pursued and (b) “the people” become 
open to a further elaboration” (5). 
“Popular sovereignty”, as a key term of the democratic lexicon, might produce 
a quandary here. As political subjects are increasingly destituted of their 
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sovereign status, in contexts of desiccated popular sovereignty, is there a 
call for sovereignty to be made or are we in need of alternative conceptual 
and affective devices which would not reiterate founding acts of violence 
implicated in the ethicopolitical genealogy of sovereignty (a genealogy 
premised upon the normative presumptions of the proper subject and the 
proper body politic)? Are we perhaps challenged to account for another 
sovereignty and render it an occasion for a radical politics of resignification? 
Do public assemblies themselves constitute a sovereignty alternative to 
reigning frames of sovereignty? So another (always-open) question that 
emerges for me here is the following: What critical form of politics does 
public assembly embody and enact in the context of dispossessed popular 
sovereignty? To what extent does this plural, transient, and embodied action 
return to safeguard values of liberal democracy that are under attack by 
neoliberal rationality and to what extent does it constitute a critical resigni-
fication of it or even an alternative to it? Is this not about an aporetic work 
of simultaneous safeguarding and critically resignifying democracy?
Finally, one of the most thought-provoking points of this book, for me, is 
the delicate distinction you make, Judith, between non-violent and passive 
resistance. Non-violent resistance, you suggest, “does not just say no to a 
violent world, but crafts the self and its relation to the world in a new way, 
seeking to embody, however provisionally, the alternative for which it strug-
gles.” How would this distinction relate to the political labor of thinking 
vulnerability and agency together and of thinking non-violence as agentive? 
How would it imply an understanding of agency as always already traversed 
by the norms and passions of vulnerability? How would it help unsettle 
reigning notions of the political?
Adriana Zaharijević 
(IFDT, University of Belgrade)
zaharijevic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs
Borrowing the link between academic and activist from Eric Fassin’s lecture3, 
I am now choosing to act in that role, stressing its state of emergency, de-
mobilization, depression and resistance. My question-comment leans specifi-
cally on the fifth chapter of Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, 
but it is also in conversation with Dispossession and Who Sings the Nation-
State?, notably, two books enacted in feminist dialogue (See: Butler, Atha-
nasiou 2013; Butler, Spivak 2007). The fifth chapter is concerned with the 
freedom of assembly, the right which can never be held alone (Butler 2015: 
186). What interest me about this individual right – which is also almost 
inherently collective – is its exercise within and against the state. Even more 
3  Eric Fassin, ‘Mobilizing Publics. Intellectuals, Activists, and the Political Work of Repre-
sentation’, November, 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeb-oEIj1AY.
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precisely, I want to understand consequences of the claim that freedom of 
assembly has to precede and exceed any form of government that confers 
or protects that right of assembly.4
In order to do so I would contextualize this claim in one possible way, and 
with one further claim: it is my wager that this book, which is not on femi-
nism, is more feminist than any other Butler wrote. Thus I wish to link 
feminism, which is in this book a very broad and, I would say, purposefully 
indefinite designation, with what is being termed as popular sovereignty. 
Throughout the book, popular sovereignty is taken as something different 
from state sovereignty. It is sometimes defined as contrary to it, at other 
times as its condition of possibility, and still at others as the power to challenge 
or even topple the state sovereignty. Exercising freedom to assemble in common, 
bodily enacting popular sovereignty, is referred to as an “anarchist interval” 
or “permanent revolution” (Butler 2015: 163). I wonder in what way it also 
has to be thought of as a “feminist interval.”
I am thinking of feminism as a kind of split with the state, or as a perpetual act 
of separating from the state, especially when state acts as (a) the facilitator in 
the expansion of the markets that transforms public entitlements into con-
sumer goods and investment opportunities, (b) as the producer of jettisoned 
lives, and (c) as the instiller of fear through its military might which forecloses 
the possibility of popular assembly. Rallying against life as unlivable – life of 
the human capital, jettisoned life or enclosed life which is privatized by its 
internalization of fear – has to be a deeply feminist concern. Putting livable life 
at the forefront of politics induces skepticism towards the state which acts as 
the deliverer of paternalist power: as the provider of citizenship rights, dif-
ferentially allocated and distributed, and provider of protection which can be 
taken away and withdrawn. Then, can a politics devoid of retrenchment in 
paternalism – which incorporates both market paternalism and military pa-
ternalism – ever be realizable within a model of a nation-state? Can feminism 
ever be pro-state, or when, at what point, in what kind of state (if any), can we 
claim that we are dealing with a feminist-friendly of even feminist state?
Vedran Džihić 
(Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna)
vedran.dzihic@univie.ac.at
Questions and thought on resistance in the periphery
As I understand Judith Butler to be an intensely politically engaged 
thinker my remarks will be guided by a two-fold outing inspired by Butler’s 
4  See also Judith Butler’s Istanbul Lecture: ‘Freedom of Assembly, or Who are the 
People?’ September, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd-7iT2JtXk. 
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lecture and her new book on performative theory of assembly. I am outing 
myself as a frustrated citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to put it dif-
ferently a citizen of Former Yugoslavia frustrated with being in-between, 
on the periphery and irrelevant, ruled by a nexus of political and eco-
nomic elites, parasiting on the permanent transition to a democracy-era 
characterized by a mixture of authoritarian and patriarchal habitus, neo-
liberal pragmatism and ethno-nationalist ideologies. This is the background 
against which an average citizen in Post-Yugoslav societies in the last 20 
years was put on the margin and reduced to a new transitional precariat, 
sentenced to an “unlivable life” (Butler 2015: 201). Listening to Judith 
Butler speaking here in Serbia, in one of the societies where forms of 
radical solidarity in opposition to political and economic forces are rather 
rare and when showing up on the surface is suppressed, either through 
direct or more frequently subtle repression, I simply have to read her book 
as a deeply political book.
Second, following Adriana Zaharijević’s reading of Butler’s book as a feminist 
one, at the same time inspired by Butler’s narrative on bodily actions and 
performative assembly of bodies as well as her term of vulnerability as a 
part of political resistance, I have to out myself as a feminist utopian urged 
to provide an argumentation able to create a framework to pose one final 
feminist utopian question at the end of my intervention.
My starting question is how much is the newly emerging competitive and 
neoliberal/competitive authoritarianism that I see flourishing in the region 
built upon patriarchal negation and exclusion of the female and all other 
non-heterosexual identities? To recompose my question I argue that there 
is precisely this patriarchal negation and exclusion of the female, and it is 
by the police and prisons (both in the metaphoric and literal sense of the 
word – here following Butler: “All public assembly is haunted by the police 
and the prison“ [185]) that societies of Former Yugoslavia are kept “stable.” 
Besides, I regard the term “stability” as a new paradigm of both the EU and 
the so-called international community when dealing with peripheries and 
so called transitional societies. Former Yugoslav countries outside the EU and 
all other countries encompassed by the EU’s Enlargement and Neighborhood 
Policy belong to this form of periphery.
The second paradigm that has emerged in the region in the last two decades 
of “transitioning to democracy” is described by the term “pragmatic.” 
Only if politicians and citizens behave “pragmatically” and “deliver” in the 
so called “school of democracy” run by the EU and the Internationals5 that 
democracy will start emerging and freedom will prevail. The problem is 
5  See here Boris Buden’s thought on the permanent transition to democracy in his 
book Zonen des Übergangs. Vom Ende des Postkommunismus (2009).
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only that looking at the very bleak results of democratization and authori-
tarian trends in the majority of the countries of Former Yugoslavia in 2016 
we cannot avoid to label the process of transitioning to democracy as failed, 
at least measured against the promises of democracy euphorically formu-
lated at the beginning of the 1990s. This is the moment where we can 
easily expose pragmatism as a cynical and in the end neoliberal ideology 
designed for countries in the periphery to keep them “stable” while ac-
cepting that the political game is dictated by (new) ruling political and 
economic elites.
Pragmatism as a new ideology of the permanent “transitional present” is 
alluding to precarity as used by Butler, since it is drawing a line between the 
few (called pragmatic elites and their clientele) and the masses (deprived, 
being a new precariat). As soon as we accept and adjust to pragmatism we 
immediately reject any kind of progressive political ideology in favor of 
empirical facts and reality, which again is – at least in the region of Former 
Yugoslavia but not only – shaped by the peculiar mixture of neoliberalism, 
nationalism and various forms of authoritarianism.
Here we can think further and extend the argumentation to yet another 
important term from Butler’s thinking, namely freedom understood as a 
term around which we organize our political resistance: “Freedom can only 
be exercised if there is enough support for the exercise of freedom, a material 
condition that enters into the act that it makes possible.”6
The question that arises here is basically how to exercise freedom in spaces 
and political entities on the periphery (like in the case of Post-Yugoslav 
countries) where freedom has been reduced and literally stolen, leading to 
a situation where material conditions for freedom are missing, where free-
dom discursively and in terms of realpolitik was miss-appropriated by 
transitional political and economic elites, or to put it more broadly in the 
sense mentioned above, by neoliberal ethno-nationalist conundrum. So, the 
question is how to reverse and renew the meaning of freedom, and how to 
reclaim democracy, and freedom in the periphery caught in seemingly endless 
transition to democracy?
One possible answer would be the one provided by Wendy Brown in her 
ferocious act to protect the very term of freedom and consequently liberal 
democracy from its (neoliberal) opponents. In one of her interviews prior 
to the publication of her book Undoing Demos. Neoliberalism’s Stealth 
Revolution, she is “in favor of trying to rehabilitate the term (democracy), 
give it substance, reawaken its potential, not only for emancipation and 
6  Judith Butler, Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance, Manuscript for the Keynote 
lecture given on 20th November 2016 in Belgrade. 
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equality but also for a notion of popular sovereignty”.7 Brown relates the 
process of reawakening the emancipatory potential to struggles by groups 
of citizens (be it in the Arab Spring, Occupy or Gezi-Park movement) fighting 
to „reclaim democracy as something that has to do with more equality than 
it has been used to signify in recent neoliberal decades, and also more 
control by the people.“ (Ibid.) But how to organize the process of reinventing 
and re-energizing democracy as an emancipatory term? And what place to 
find for the people?
As aspects of sudden or provisional assembly are already – without entering 
the debate on self-constitution and struggles over “who we are” – a major new 
formation of the public space able to confront the authoritarian state (regime) 
on the periphery with a quest for freedom, equality and solidarity, for a “life 
as livable.” Here we might think of whether, how and if not why protests in 
Bosnia in February 2014, collective actions on the streets of Skopje recently, 
or many other forms of assemblies in the newly emerging illiberal belt in 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe (including Hungary, Poland, Turkey) are 
able (or made unable) to change the parameters of “life as unlivable.”
Finally, following Adriana Zaharijević’s8 argument that freedom to assemble, 
besides bodily enacting popular sovereignty, also embodies feminist princi-
ples. To bring the argument back to Butler’s book, I am arguing that this 
above mentioned specific form of neoliberal authoritarianism with patriar-
chal negation and exclusion of the female, built upon terms of “stability,” 
“pragmatism” and ethnic nationalism, is preventing new forms of public 
assembly in the region of Former Yugoslavia and keeping the regimes alive. 
If this is right we might argue that precisely feminism can be taken as a key 
to understand and to attack these newly emerging post-transitional illib-
eral/authoritarian regimes. It is – to invert Putin’s words directed against 
Pussy Riot – the feminist fight against the “soul of man” (13) that can attack 
these regimes, both in ideological terms as well as in political terms.
This is precisely the place where we need Butler’s term of “vulnerability,” 
more precisely her affirmative use of vulnerability, “understood as a ‘de-
liberate exposure to power’ as a part of the very meaning of political re-
sistance as an embodied enactment.” (15) Against the concerns that 
“vulnerability is disjoined from resistance, mobilization, and other forms of 
7  See Wendy Brown, Reclaiming Democracy: An Interview with Wendy Brown on Occupy, 
Sovereignty, and Secularism, in Critical Legal Thinking, January 30th 2013, http://critical-
legalthinking.com/2013/01/30/reclaiming-democracy-an-interview-with-wendy-
brown-on-occupy-sovereignty-and-secularism/
Of course, the sense that democracy (and the notion of freedom) needs to be reconstituted 
is widely shared by authors and scholars ranging from Skinner (1998) Runciman (2005), 
Derrida (2006) or Badiou (2006).
8  See Adriana Zaharijević’s contribution in this volume.
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deliberate and agentic politics,” (16), Butler argues that “the very meaning 
of vulnerability changes when it becomes understood as part of the very 
practice of political resistance” and that “we can come to understand bodily 
vulnerability as something that is actually marshaled or mobilized for the 
purposes of resistance.” (18-19)
When we speak about resistance in the periphery characterized by patriarchal 
and patrimonial male structures with male bodies deeply inscribed into the 
authoritarian inner-life of the regime and the “other” in gender terms is 
automatically marginalized and excluded, we have to imagine the resistance 
as a truly feminist endeavor. To put it in Butler’s words,
Feminism is a crucial part of these networks of solidarity and resistance 
precisely because feminist critique destabilizes those institutions that de-
pend on the reproduction of inequality and injustice, and it criticizes those 
institutions and practices that inflict violence on women and gender mi-
norities, and, in fact, all minorities subject to police power for showing up 
and speaking out as they do. (20)
This brings me back to the beginning of my intervention and to the announced 
utopian feminist question: Can a feminist rallying against “life as unlivable” 
be the way out for the peripheral regions in East- and Southeastern Europe, 
more precisely in the Post-Yugoslav realm? Or to put it differently, to argue 
that only a moment where feminism becomes pro-state can be a moment 
where freedom, responsibility and thus democracy will come back to the 
region on a broader scale than in this very room.
Judith Butler
Responses to Athena Athanasiou, 
Adriana Zaharijević, Vedran Džihić
Wonderful. Many important issues raised. First of all, thank you Athena for 
your trenchant comments. It is true that plural action and plurality are not 
quite the same as pluralism, and how to think about differentiating those 
terms is important. I certainly read and engage the work of William Con-
nolly on that topic, interested in the way that “pluralization” works for him, 
but perhaps I also move in a slightly different direction than he does. I agree 
that it is important to think about assembly in ways that are not constrained 
by the accepted parameters of liberal democracy.
In your remarks you also suggest that perhaps something we might call 
humanity is understood as persisting even as the human has fallen into 
crisis, so how are we to think about that? Is there also a resignification of 
the human going on? I am reminded of the importance of resituating hu-
manness and the human animal as one form of creaturely life among others, 
and that this is in part a way of understanding, perhaps developing a different 
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bio-political vocabulary, one that does not disavow the animal in the human, 
the animality of the human, but also the human dimensions of companionate 
species, as Donna Haraway reminds us. But also, perhaps we need another 
name to think about the dignity of this persistence that happens among 
humans who are with cruelty expelled from the human norm by those who 
seek to monopolize its definition in the service of racial projects. Is something 
we might still call humanity that which emerges precisely when the expulsion 
is refused either by those who are expected to execute that strategy or those 
who are subject to the brutality of that effacement. I am certainly not op-
posed to humanity. What would it mean to say that? That would be wrong, 
I certainly defend “the humanities” (in English), that is terribly important, 
although it is always possible to ask, where is humanity in the humanities? 
Let us speculate that humanity traverses and upends the logic of exclusion 
by which the human is produced and sustained. Even so, humanity brings 
with it its own specter, maybe the animal is the specter of humanity, or 
maybe none of us can have humanity without also engaging the spectral 
being of the animal. So, I appreciate the question of specter, since Derrida 
is in the room, and is always in the room when we try to think seriously 
about these issues. So, what is spectral in the assembly? I think that there 
are spectral assemblies in every assembly. I am re-reading now Marx’s 18th 
Brumaire, as a way of trying to think about how the anachronistic reemerges 
in an unexpected and animated form in the present. And of course, to even 
understand Syntagma, Gezi Park, Tahrir, all of these have enormous genealo-
gies which are, I would say, selectively animated in the present, and maybe 
even the Assemblée nationale in the Jeu de Paume is with us as well. The 
question is whether the specter of past assemblies operates as an unfinished 
promise or unfulfilled history, or whether it actually disrupts the historical 
continuum. In the 18th Brumaire, it was generally unexpected that the peo-
ple would miss the monarchic power that they destroyed, and how easy it 
was for them to give up their freedoms to a power who seemed, if only un-
consciously, to be a living substitute for that lost authoritarian ruler. The 
sequence: we have destroyed the monarchy! What have we destroyed! Oh 
look, we have destroyed nothing: the Ruler is back!
As for the politics of representation, I do not, cannot, reject it thoroughly. 
I accept, for instance, parliamentary democracy, even if the parliamentary 
form cannot exhaust all we mean by democracy. All forms of parliamentary 
democracy depend however on what I would call popular sovereignty. But 
popular sovereignty is not distinct from what Sheldon Wolin called the “fugi-
tive” dimension of democracy: it supports and withdraws, it installs and de-
stroys. When it no longer supports the parliamentary democracy that it 
elected, it can withdraw itself and threaten that government with delegitima-
tion even if that government responds to that delegitimation with military 
force. And responding with military force only makes that regime more vul-
nerable to delegitimation; it does not mean that the government necessarily 
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comes down, it can continue. And there are non-military forms of coercion 
that we might think about as well, such as the constraints on information.
So this power to confer or withdraw legitimacy is one that belongs to a people 
quite regardless of whether or not it is recognized by law. It is an extra-legal 
power without which legal powers can only operate without legitimation. 
With this in mind, then, popular sovereignty may well be a term that maintains 
closer allegiances to anarchist moments, ones that we can find implicit in 
every parliamentary democratic form. I am not saying we should be anarchist 
rather than parliamentary democrats, no, I am saying there is an anarchist 
possibility within every parliamentary form; this is surely why so many 
democratic constitutions are so fearful of the mob, so fearful of the crowd, so 
fearful of the popular will, even fearful of its own elections, so that this popular 
moment has to be managed and constrained. In other words, a radically 
democratic potential always needs to be managed by every parliamentary 
democracy, and I think there is a tension there that I would want to preserve 
between the two. I also think, and perhaps this is because I have been thinking 
about the Middle East and Israel/Palestine, that popular sovereignty can be 
divisible. The sovereign is not necessarily a figure of indivisible unity or a 
master figure. I know it is often defined that way, but the definition does not 
help us. Sovereignty can be divisible; it can even be dispersed. I am extremely 
interested in the idea of a dispersed sovereignty. And it might be something 
other than pluralism, it might be a form of cohabiting in ways that acknowledge 
difference but also the obligatory claim cohabitation at the same time.
I also think that without sovereignty, it is very hard to defend the very im-
portant concept of political self-determination that is needed for decoloniza-
tion efforts of all kinds. For example, it is important for Greece, which should 
be able to decide how it pays its debts, and manage its own economic activ-
ity, and surely should not be “owned” by Germany or the Eurozone or the 
World Bank. For Palestine, which has not yet seen the rights of political 
self-determination, for native peoples in Canada, Europe, the US and 
Mexico. Many indigenous movements rely very strongly on the concept of 
political self-determination and I think that that is linked with the idea of 
popular sovereignty, and I am not sure we should – just because sover-
eignty has a bad name – so quickly get rid of it altogether. But let us think 
about what it means or how it can be revised in those particular contexts. I am 
working on non-violence now, and I suppose I am working towards an idea 
of an aggressive non-violent strategy, and maybe I need to disavow passive 
resistance, but I think that there is a way of thinking non-violence as agentive 
and as aggressive, even as it refuses violence. There is another way of thinking 
about non-violence as non-action, and that seems important as well. If a 
strike is a non-action, a not-working, is it for that reason passive? I like to 
think about the emphatic refusal of violence. And maybe I will make an 
argument about that in time.
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It is true that I want to claim that the freedom of assembly precedes and 
exceeds any form of government, and maybe that is an anarchist notion or 
maybe it is a popular democratic notion, or a populist view, I do not know. 
I do think that we would all do well to think about why Ernesto Laclau 
thought that there could be a left populism – maybe that would also be a 
question for Eric Fassin, given his own suggestion that perhaps we cannot 
really work with the idea of “the people” as such. Laclau published a book 
On populist reason making the case for a left populism, asking what makes 
them left and how do they work. Perhaps “the people” is a fiction, but that 
fact alone does not tell us whether it is an enabling or a disabling fiction.
I love it that everybody thinks this is a feminist book. I do not have any 
problem with that. But if it is feminist, it is also queer. Bernice Johnson 
Reagon spoke those beautiful passages on coalitions, emphasizing the dif-
ficulty of staying in coalitions, defining what a coalition is, especially across 
racial boundaries, what a feminist coalition is and can be (See Johnson 
Reagon: 2000). I rely on that enormously, but queer actions, especially 
those mobilized on the issues of HIV and violence, perhaps even before 
Occupy, have been crucial for my understanding of alignments and mobi-
lization, of networks formed across time and space, even between the living 
and the dead. So, if it is going to be feminist, it has to be queer, or feminist/
queer/radical-democratic.
I acknowledge that there has to be a utopian horizon within which we think 
and act. I guess I have come to that conclusion, I did not always think that, 
but I think experimenting with the possible is something we get to do in 
academic life, in universities and art, in our creative and theoretical work, 
and that it is a radical act when the very idea of another future becomes 
impossible to consider. So opening up the horizon of the possible is not a bad 
idea. Some horrible things can enter into the picture, of course – very bad 
possibilities – but also some other kinds of possibilities as well. I mean, this 
is where politics actually involves a kind of crafting, how we think about 
principles that can be crafted into forms of life: less as prescriptive than 
generative principles, considered as a matrix out of which a set of possibilities 
for life might be generated. I know that pragmatism has become a combative 
term, I think that Nancy Fraser has tried to suggest that pragmatism could 
be used for both feminism and for socialism, so maybe we need to consider 
that. But I do not know if feminism is the way out. I know that Butler cannot 
offer the way out. I was always worried that Bosnia became an example in 
US feminism when Catherine MacKinnon claimed that she “represented the 
women of Bosnia.” I thought it was maybe a bad idea for her to say that. 
I think it is a really bad idea for US intellectuals to go touring around the 
world telling people what the way out might be. No. If anything, I come here 
to listen to you and become a slightly more informed and thoughtful person, 
by virtue of your challenges, as a consequence of what you tell me.
91
  WITH JUDITH BUTLER ON VULNERABILITY/RESISTANCE
As for Adriana’s question about feminism and the state, I do not have a cat-
egorical view. We can pose the questions abstractly: is there a way to refigure 
the state on feminist principles? Or, must feminism always be an anti-statist 
project? I would agree that feminism should not have as its primary goal 
state-building, but that does not mean that certain feminist principles should 
not organize state policy. Perhaps it is necessary to ask first about the con-
temporary condition of the state, since what we see is the dismantling of 
social democracy and health care, the outsourcing of basic services, and the 
implication of neo-liberal and market rationalities in state structures. If we 
oppose the dismantling of social services, the outsourcing of public goods, 
then do we do that in part on feminist grounds? If so, then we are interested 
in a renewed state structure, but are not in principle opposed to a state.
So, which state are we seeking to be part of, or not part of? Maybe we need a 
radical and feminist critique of neoliberalism and its privatization strategies 
and its market rationality in order to usher in a different set of values that would 
remind us of what the public good is, and of our obligation to preserve the 
public good, which does include various kinds of services from which women 
benefit – which does include education, healthcare and shelter. I am not sure 
what to say there, but my thinking is very dependent on Wendy Brown’s on 
this issue. I heard Vedran’s frustration and his voice, trying to speak, wonder-
ing about what can be said or heard from here, positioned on the periphery. 
I suppose we have to ask whether only the center maintains the conditions for 
freedom, or whether there is, as it were, an assembly among and for the pe-
ripheries. Yes, we are in a small room in a hostile environment, and we do not 
always know how to make change outside of the confines of academic life, but 
apparently the Assemblée nationale was in a small room in a hostile environ-
ment and finally emerged as quite a power. A lot of consequential movements 
have started in small rooms in hostile environments. Sometimes, as Virginia 
Woolf tells us, one needs a small room, a room of one’s own, for the composi-
tion of thought. As Kafka tells us, it turns out that small rooms are adjacent to 
other rooms and corridors, passageways and adjoining buildings, and that 
much depends on how one regards the beginning and end of the spatial infra-
structure that conditions livability. Anyway, thank you all for your difficult and 
important questions, I am most grateful and only sorry that I cannot address 
them all in the way that they surely deserve to be addressed.
Nikola Petković 
(Department of Cultural Studies, Faculty for Humanities, University of Rijeka)
npetkovic@ffri.hr
After the holy trinity of gender, race and class faded away and identity simply 
replaced them by becoming the buzzword of the academe in the ‘90s, two terms 
emerged designating the beginning of the third millennium: uncertainty 
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and precarity. The fact that a fairly recent spell check still underlines precar-
ity as an unknown term confirms its ‘originality’. Since minds are always 
faster than their discursive articulation that uttered words turns into written 
discourse there is nothing wrong with the software-slowness—certainly 
nothing that would question the legitimacy of terminological ‘innovations’. 
Actually, ‘innovation’ might be an inappropriate term here and I suggest to 
replace it by ‘re-contextualization’. Because people lived precarious lives 
filled with uncertainty since the very beginning of time. These two terms 
are today under the spotlights not because of their ‘originality’ or protean 
power of mimicry throughout Western history but because of the very fabric 
of the times we live in. Therefore all the criticisms that this reinvigoration 
of operative terminology suffers being seen as ‘nothing new’ I find rather 
misplaced. In terms of paradigm shift, be it in humanities, social or natural 
sciences, these terms are precisely here as a paradigmatic framework for 
understanding the world while hoping to change it. Since prior to making 
any effort to change the world (even in a utopian way of remodeling it dis-
cursively) we must be sure that we do our best to understand it, and since, 
at the moment, we have no better pair of terms as tools in reading our present, 
I strongly suggest to use them to the best of our abilities. 
Two recent books confirm the importance of the pair: The Cunning of Un-
certainty by Helga Nowotny (2016), and Notes Toward a Performative Theory 
of Assembly by Judith Butler. In this short note toward the re-contextualization 
of operative terminology that opens effective modes in our efforts to under-
stand our present, I will address only Judith Butler’s latest book, while 
seeking for modes of solidarity in the existing context of so-called special 
interest groups targeting particular spheres of interest that harm their very 
core of existence.
And here I speak from my personal experience while living in the US in the 
early ‘90s and witnessing the bracketing of interest among either racial, 
ethnic, religious issues or those of gender or sexual preference. The question 
I have (having in mind the entirety of Butler’s work) is how productive it is 
to think within a respective group, sharing its experience, its vulnerability 
and precarity without making serious efforts to draw a diagonal cut through 
various but mutual sites of vulnerability.
After being asked this question, at the panel in Belgrade, Judith Butler 
recognized many important points, underscoring not only the content but 
also ways of elaborating the manifestations of special interest groups in the 
field. She pointed out that the situation in the US academy in which claims 
of identity are put forward is a very difficult one, while thinking that it does 
sometimes produce an ethnographic shock on the part of those who travel 
to US campuses and see how the logic of political identity gets reproduced 
in ways that are quite antagonistic and that produce rupture time and again. 
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She saw it being tight and said that she was not certain whether or not 
special interests are the best term to talk about dispersing solidarity the way 
I imagined it underscoring that special interest groups is the term that the 
Republican Party uses in order to talk about women – that means half the 
population has “special interests” and it’s not the general will, they make a 
distinction between what is a special interest and who is the general public. 
Anybody who is marked by gender is, Butler said, a “special interest.” But 
still, there is a really big question here how to deal with that marking and 
how it emerges in political discourse. Maybe we could slip forward and re-
member that absolute identification with another, that is, being able to 
completely and utterly take the place of another in whatever it is they have 
suffered, or in whatever it is they struggle for – is not a possibility, and cer-
tainly not a basis of solidarity, it cannot be. Then she pointed out that a 
particular example of comparative genocide studies. They have done some 
really important work about exactly what can be said, how we establish a 
dialogue on atrocity, a dialogue on mass death, how we establish a dialogue 
on the technologies of state-sponsored murder. All those questions are really 
important to think about in common, even though many of us come to these 
issues from very different historical circumstances.
Biljana Kašić 
(Department of Sociology, University of Zadar) 
bi.kasic@unizd.hr
Critical claims and critical ‘eyes’: the people
Reading Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly was certainly an 
exciting theoretical venture. Not only because this book deepened but also 
because it articulated in a fresh and lucid manner Judith Butler’s already 
on-going self-conversation and responses to the key issues of the historical 
present. These issues which include precarity, political agency, vulnerability, 
violence, resistance, dissent, discrimination, responsibility, among others, 
particularly appeared in her books Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning 
and Violence, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, and Dispossession: The 
Performative in the Political, written in the form of a dialogue with Athena 
Athanasiou.
In this brief contribution there is no need to give an explanation on why this 
study engages our critical discourse; rather it is about how to utilize it, being 
aware of the limits of our most convinced ways of knowing, articulating and 
acting. In a deliberative gesture of ethical and political reflection that maintains 
both tension and theoretical bonding of respect while performing the realm 
of a new critical activity, Judith Butler allowed for the ‘Performative Theory 
of Assembly’ to take place on the scene, in the auditorium of the Cultural 
Centre in the heart of Belgrade.
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The presence of the constant transposition of the modalities of theme that 
seek the political within a neoliberal contemporaneity and countering it at 
the same time, while aiming to expose through the possibilities of public as-
sembly, or more precisely, through its, as the author says, “responsibilization” 
(Butler 2015: 15), moved my aspiration towards a simple claim for public 
agency. What stands behind this claim and to what does it obligate us?
Apart from various provocative thoughts and convincing arguments on bodily 
and embodied assembly in public spaces that re-configure the political, I will 
draw attention to the potency for the politicality of assembly from a very 
distinct angle. Namely, by referring to the syntagm ‘We are still the people’ 
(Butler 2015: 181) that Butler addressed precisely as a response to a “his-
torical articulation of urgency,” disclosed as a need to oppose the acceleration 
of precarity and economic inequality of humans, I will try to rethink what 
we keep by recreating the exterior of human-ness.
On the one hand, what to connect within providing us the people today, in 
this repetitive claim “We are still the people”, that allows us to think whether 
humanness might be the ultimate bonding, or the condition of being human; 
on the other hand, in which way does this declaration resonate in the formation 
of public assembly by claiming for the shape of human possibility as its con-
dition? In order to see an intrinsic link between these two concerns, one has 
to make an additional effort rather than a switch in perspective.
This so-called phrase ‘We are still the people’ is present in the book even 
when it is not expressly mentioned, through the webs of other thoughts, 
concepts, questions, imaginative positions, always signalizing something 
that goes beyond enunciation itself, or its “vocalized performative” (Butler 
2015: 170). What thus thrilled me at first glance was not the problematic 
we, or even more problematic syntagm ‘we as the people’, or ‘we are the 
people’, rather the unexpected meanings that still implies and creates.
“It can mean, ‘we are still the people’ – therefore, still persisting and not yet 
destroyed” (Butler 2015: 181), as Butler pleads for one of the possible in-
terpretations, by highlighting equality as a matrix of public constituency 
gathered around an assumed yet indefinable “the commons” that is to be 
jointly struggled for. While I must admit the point that embodied equality 
through a public assembly linked to human interdependency and “a fair 
distribution of labour tasks” (ibid.) as an ‘inquiry’ involuntarily implies 
other political claims upon bodily agencies under the conditions of neoliberal 
governing and its reshaping and defracting of the concept of “the commons” 
today, I would argue that this abovementioned syntagm elicits a response 
on another level.
What I found to be most significant is that ‘being still the people’ invokes the 
possibility of enabling and creating a human zone at, paradoxically, the very 
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edge of the human zone itself and despite ethical disputes around human 
subjectivity, political agency and popular sovereignty. Subaltern, subju-
gated, oppressed, marginalized, “banned” as the one Other-ed, or the one 
whose being is “necessary prerequisite exclusion for sovereign inclusion” 
(Nayar 2010: 5) have confronted and occupied our gaze.
Hence at this point we are precisely talking about the condition of governing 
human life as a political subject-citizen as governing life itself that is at the 
present time, according to some decolonial theorists and critical thinkers 
(Mbembe, Beller, Gržinić, Berardi etc.), marked through necropolitical 
practices for the greatest extent. Based rather on the “distribution of death” 
(Mbembe 2003: 24) than on the “fair distribution of labor tasks,” they pro-
duced a capitalization of death since, as Marina Gržinić argued “(…) the 
logic is not the maximum of life but the minimum for living (…)” (2013: 7). 
In the strict sense, it is the logic of how the global capitalist social body is 
organized (Gržinić 2008, internet) and “how racially ontologized hierarchies 
of space” (McIntyre, Nast 2011:1466) in convergence with this expose the 
modes of production of life. 
When the Swiss visual artist Ursula Biemann, for example, in her video essay 
project Performing the Border (2000: 133-144) explored the spaces pro-
vided by the unrestricted movement of capital and labour power within 
neoliberal capitalism, she introduced the notion of “geobodies” as a peculiar 
metaphor for mobile factories that rely on the exploiting regime of women’s 
bodies that serve capital there, especially concentrated on the border and 
around the border. This geobodies trajectory operates very efficiently in 
various countries, increasingly mapping spaces for bare survival both for 
female migrants and local ‘immobile’, subaltern women based on providing 
a bias that enhances cheap and overexploited labour and enforces work 
under slave-like and subhuman conditions, along with exploitation and 
over-subjugation. Migrant women workers from respective ‘marked’ states 
or regions (such as Southeast Asia) have very often lived under border 
conditions and at the border of living bodies whose neo-slavery position 
emerges out of invasive neoliberal strategies that often intersect with “racial-
ized nationalism and disjunctive morale economies based on kinship and 
ethnicity” (Ong 2009: 160). Therefore, “biopolitical otherness,” a term used 
by Aihwa Ong (2009: 161), contains the implications of all these moments 
in their “otherness status,” from precarious non-human status to noncitizen 
one, from colonised body to dehumanised subjectivity.
How can we then make a claim for political acting knowing that any atten-
tiveness to the substantive harms of human discrimination and subjugation 
within the public field cannot be realized if the intentional ignorance of 
human beings, who have been forced to live under extreme conditions and 
substantially de-humanized is at risk? How can we then struggle “for a world 
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in which life becomes livable for those who have not yet been valued as living 
beings?” (Butler 2015: 183). These kinds of questions may leave us in a state 
of human anxiety or caught by ‘ontological’ melancholia.
Or going further, whether the possibility of human assembly in reminding 
us of what ‘still the people’ is, means an ultimate condition of acting as be-
ing, or rather a kind of transformative compassion among humans through 
modes of social reciprocity and recognition, and above all, solidarity (Berlant 
2011: 182). Enrique Dussel, in advocating for the stand that “life is the 
only absolute moment in all ethical and political description” (Dussel 2013), 
starts from a material ethics of the affirmation of life as a form of counter-
acting in favor of those who are poor, oppressed, and hyper-exploited, and 
seemingly, by this, opens up towards an initial proposal of possible engagement. 
However, a new modality of ‘the political’, in order to activate a critical 
positioning and acting, rests on this agonistic ‘burden’ as well on the capacity 
of ‘humanistic resistance’ (Said’s term) that the still enigmatic ‘We are still 
the people’ implies and offers. And as I presume, just as Judith Butler notes 
in this book, on “radical hope.”
Jasmina Husanović 
(Faculty of Philosophy, University of Tuzla) 
jasminamak@gmail.com
I would like to thank the organizers for the opportunity to take part in this 
seminar, since I have had the pleasure to engage closely with Judith Butler’s 
thought in my research, teaching and activism in the past decades. My questions 
and comments concerning Butler’s latest work Notes Toward a Performative 
Theory of Assembly (Butler 2015) stem from the experiences of academic, 
artistic and activist work in Bosnia and Herzegovina where traumatic common 
corporeal injuries and predicaments have been normalized and institutionalized 
for a long time, through the war in the 1990s as well as in the so-called ‘post-
Dayton’ period. For more than two decades the twin logic of ethnonationalist 
and neoliberal governance of affect and abject in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
resulted in a particular set of ways governing ‘human waste’ through normal-
ized terror (Husanović 2015; 2014a), or „terror as usual“ (Taussig 1992). 
I think it would be very interesting to discuss several issues in Butler’s latest 
book from the perspective that takes into account the lessons of protests and 
plenums in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, especially in terms of political 
strategies and infrastructural challenges of direct democracy and social revolt 
as I have analyzed elsewhere (Husanović 2014b).
I was particularly impressed with the insistence in Butler’s book on the 
necessities of producing and reproducing the actual infrastructural condi-
tions for politics – for political expression, subjectivization and action. In 
this sense, I think that such material experiences of precarious subjectivities 
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caught in multiple and complex emergencies affecting our politics, labor 
and thought today must be understood as a matter of engaged political 
enterprise on the battleground for the social body and public good today. 
To play with some metaphors from Pierre Bourdieu’s opus and go beyond 
them (Bourdieu 1990: 3), “a fieldwork in philosophy” today has to be about 
producing knowledge as “a martial art” honed through political antagonization 
and common struggles in new social movements around us. Our battle is 
against the politics of terror which through its “irregular rhythms of numbing 
and shock” constitutes “the apparent normality of the abnormal created by 
the state of emergency” (Taussig 1992: 12). This, however, implies a quantum 
leap in the degrees and forms of creative and risk-taking work to be under-
taken when resisting normalized terror, whilst firmly set on the tracks of 
the politics of hope, solidarity and equality, in the horizon of social change 
and justice.  It is a daunting endeavor to forge, at the very heart of this po-
litical knowledge enterprise, a critical distance from emergency-induced 
hysteria, numbness or acceptance, and against resentment, envy, nostalgia, 
melancholia and despair as predominant affective mechanisms of the cul-
turalized neoliberal governance.
For instance, there is a tendency to interpret the latest events in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which emerged as an amalgam of performative assemblies 
and street protests spreading from Tuzla throughout the country, as coming 
about suddenly, “out of nowhere,” whereas actually they were the outcome 
of a nexus of long-term emancipatory practices and movements that have 
been nesting in the fields of social activism, critical pedagogies, knowledge 
production and are there for many years. These practices and collectives 
have been questioning and challenging the merging of ethnocorporate and 
neoliberal regimes of power and violence in their particular post-atrocity 
order of governance instituted in Bosnia and Herzegovina for more than 
twenty years, colonizing all spaces of publicity and everyday life. The culture 
of terror, trauma and exception that is embedded in the so-called „transi-
tional justice“ industry exposes political and economic orders where all lives, 
life as a whole, feeds into the “ethnicity incorporated” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2009). From what has happened in the social revolt engulfing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2014, and in the period afterwards, there emerges not a 
context-specific, but a common and universalizing imperative everywhere 
in global politics – to create, invent and nurture new modes of struggle 
against inequality and reclaim the tools, or the means of production neces-
sary for such political enterprise. The question of solidarity seems of para-
mount importance here.
In this sense, what strikes me as a particularly significant insight in Butler’s 
latest work is the argument that claims of identification with someone’s 
predicament are not to be equated with solidarity, or what would be politi-
cally productive solidarity (Butler 2015). In addition to this, there is a call 
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there to move away from, and abandon the attempts to generalize or uni-
versalize cultural identifications in political thought and action. In my 
opinion, this directly speaks to the need to turn towards the question of class 
antagonisms, and to take class as a key category of analysis and political 
mobilization. This, of course, includes the sphere of knowledge production, 
which is also marked by class antagonisms and deeply unequal and unjust 
political economies. Speaking about the field of knowledge production 
through the critique of its political economy underneath also equips us to 
go beyond not only this false dichotomy between ‘intellectuals’ and ‘activists’, 
but also those equally false or docile claims that academic work, however 
critical, is enough for the political enterprise we have to engage in current 
political circumstances and our lives. We could witness how the field of 
knowledge production populated with many social actors and their trans-
formative practices in a specific setting can foster promising political inter-
ventions, such as performative assemblies or street protests, by actively 
producing and reproducing the infrastructure, the tools, the means of po-
litical protest in deteriorating circumstances. I would like to place emphasis 
on those particular affective mechanisms which underpin the neoliberal/
ethnonationalist colonial political economies rampant in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which clearly indicate the collusion and complicity of local and in-
ternational elites and ideological orders they fodder.
Within the constraints of this seminar, I have chosen to pose a couple of 
specific questions concerning the arguments in the book. The first one is 
about the relationship between violence and nonviolence, especially when 
referring to Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence (Benjamin 1986).  The 
second one refers to the paradox or crevice between fear and hope.  This is 
something I am quite concerned about, considering that the possibility of 
future performative public assemblies is severely curtailed by the ever-
stronger reorganization and preparation of state orders and their repressive 
forces to contain and prevent civic protest in any shape or form, using increas-
ing levels of violence and inducing and disseminating fear through the social 
fabric and social body. What also concerns me is the saturation of various 
instantiations of socialist, social democratic, radical democratic, as well as 
liberal political scholarship and activism with a series of platitudes, withdrawals 
and complacencies about political organization today, often amounting to 
something that resembles a peculiar solipsism of passion, which deadens the 
potential to think and act politically, which evades the urge to embody pas-
sionate subjectivities collectively. In this sense, it seems to me that the problems 
and weaknesses in the field of knowledge production are largely to do with 
the refusal to engage in actually producing the public space, with its infra-
structure, to orchestrate public resistance, protest and transformation. I think 
we lack enough discussion on how we, as knowledge producers, embody 
individually or collectively the symptoms of alienation on the affective level, 
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through the reproduction of affective bodily states of defeat, depression, 
mistrust, faint-heartedness, cynicism, hopelessness, and so on. Perhaps the 
right slogan at this moment of facing the politics of terror of inequality anew 
is to wish upon ourselves much more of everything that is already too much 
for us, because when things get truly unbearable, radical hope and the drive 
to change such things seem to ground themselves in new and promising forms.
To sum up the questions: How should we position ourselves towards violence 
in the context of bodies occupying public space and claiming public good 
that need to navigate the paradox between fear and hope, through bodily 
vulnerability, especially because the crevice between the two seems to be 
rather difficult to think and act upon? What kind of affective fiber is necessary 
to take on productively those political strategies that blur or displace the 
distinction between violence and nonviolence, and dominant normative 
prescriptions that go along with it?
Judith Butler
Responses to Nikola Petković, 
Biljana Kašić and Jasmina Husanović
Thank you very much. There are again so many important points here, 
and I just want to thank you for elaborating your questions in the ways that 
you have.
The situation in the US academy in which claims of identity are put forward 
is a very difficult one, and I think it does sometimes produce an ethno-
graphic shock on the part of those who travel to US campuses and see how 
the logical political identity gets reproduced in ways that are quite antago-
nistic and that produce rupture time and again. I think that’s right. I don’t 
know if I would call them special interests, I think that’s the term that the 
Republican Party uses in order to talk about women – that means half the 
population has “special interests”, it’s not the general will, they make a 
distinction between what is a special interest and who is the general public. 
Anybody who is marked by gender is a “special interest.” But still, there’s 
a really big question here how to deal with that marking and how does it 
emerge in political discourse. Maybe we could slip forward and remember 
that absolute identification with another, that is, being able to completely 
and utterly take the place of another in whatever it is they have suffered, 
or in whatever it is they struggle for, is not a possibility, and certainly not 
a basis of solidarity, it cannot be. And I think, for instance, comparative 
genocide studies has done some really important work about exactly what 
can be said, how we establish a dialogue on atrocity, a dialogue on mass 
death, how we establish a dialogue on the technologies of state-sponsored 
murder. All those questions are really important to think about in common, 
even though many of us come to these issues from very different historical 
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circumstances. I think that there are better ways of doing that, but something 
like that strikes me as closer to a model of solidarity I’m interested in.
I do think that we are still the people, whoever is standing there or here, 
whoever is part of the larger network of support. There is this deictic moment 
where I’m pointing to those of us who are assembled – whoever we happen 
to be, as if to say, “we have not yet been eradicated.” That does not mean 
that others have not been eradicated, indeed the reason we can say that we 
are still the people is that we know very well that others are no longer the 
people, or that they are dead, or dying, or they are at risk of death, or expelled 
or imprisoned, having lost some substantial access to the rights of citizen-
ship. There is a very important relationship between memorialization and 
assembly that we haven’t really thought about today, but which I know has 
been part of the Women in Black movement. Asserting the grievability of 
lives that have been lost, marking them, naming them in common, is not 
necessarily a monumental form of mourning, but more simply a set of prac-
tices of public acknowledgment that become reiterated throughout public 
space and time – that is a crucial feature of many public assemblies. The 
political power of mourning is evident, in Palestine, where it is sometimes 
difficult to know what is a funeral and what is a protest. And I know that 
this happens in many places, I know that Assad used to, perhaps still does, 
shoot at the Syrian people who gathered to mourn those who were killed 
by his army. He clearly feared the potential of an uprising on the part of 
those who gathered together to mourn. I think that the question of grievabil-
ity and marking grievability is one way to transform the idea of human waste 
into valuable life, or grievable life – livable life is the aspiration of the still 
living, grievable life is the entitlement of the dead, or those who are on the 
way towards death. I think the fact that we are still the people marks the 
fact that we could be destroyed, some of us have been destroyed, and in that 
face of actual destruction we are still here, assembled, but also exposing 
ourselves in a way that every assembly does to the proximate and possible 
force of destruction.
The particular political situation of “transitional justice” is clearly an important 
one, a chance for a “diagonal” or “transversal” analysis that would consider 
post-genocidal, post-dictatorial, and decolonized conditions, but also apart-
heid and occupation (we are not yet post-occupation and on some analyses, 
apartheid continues in new forms). All of these histories are histories of 
enormous state violence. What is the place of critical memory studies in relation 
to the dominant and official versions of history, and even the sorts of narrative 
forms of a life-story required by non-governmental organizations and inter-
national law? Allied with this question is another, namely, what is the spe-
cific harm of normalizing trauma? And what happens under regimes that 
understand themselves as post-atrocity, or that have normalized unspeakable 
losses, or even capitalized on their unspeakability. I have a great deal to learn 
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about how neo-liberalism has entered into the process of “rebuilding” the 
Balkans, and how NGO discourse has imposed a language on trauma that 
effaces those that have emerged from the very people who have undergone 
violence and loss of such magnitude. And I’m interested to hear that there 
are a number of practices, including art practices and critical pedagogy that 
are part of the knowledge production that seeks to interrupt, or call into 
question, the post-atrocity order of government. That seems crucial. And I 
think there is also a way of bringing that forward.
I recently visited the Centro Conti in Buenos Aires where they of course have 
given a great deal of thought to memorializing those who have disappeared 
or explicitly killed. They make a distinction between sensationalist repre-
sentations in museums dedicated to telling and documenting histories of 
violence and those that actually work with a pedagogical aim, and which 
also allow for a spatial organization of memory, such that one can pass in 
and out of the sites of torture and have time for reflection. This latter does 
not “sanitize” but neither does it seek to “retraumatize” or overwhelm those 
who wish to pass through those spaces. I think as well that such sites are 
important not only for the way they memorialize, but also for how they 
teach, and then again for the possibility to emerge with a new view on the 
ethics and politics of non-violence. I’m interested in critical memory studies 
in that respect, but I also think that there are comparative and transna-
tional projects that are dealing with that, in ways that are really important. 
I also agree that fiscal elites and their state allies are very interested in sup-
pressing civilian protest and expanding the military functions of the police. 
It did strike me as quite horrible that the French government, in establishing 
a state of emergency, not only suspended the freedom of assembly, but 
identified the climate change conference as the one in relationship to which 
there shall be no demonstration. So, a very tactical, very political use of the 
state of emergency to quell civilian protest. At the time of this re-editing, 
the Turkish government has instigated legal action against academic in 
Turkey who signed a “peace petition” in an effort to establish a better un-
derstanding with the Kurds. The call to peace has become punishable.
Perhaps I have one last thing to say about depression, melancholy and hope-
lessness – themes that we have spoken about during these days. One of the 
features of neoliberalism that is most nefarious is that we are each held re-
sponsible for the suffering we undergo, we expected to “bounce back” and 
to show a form of resilience that is part of the entrepreneurial spirit of self-
making. This manic imperative corresponds to the classic melancholic and 
depressive position. Mania is the inverse side of melancholia, and so part of 
its own logic. The self-punishing side of melancholia is more well-known: 
one imagines oneself to be the sole source of one’s suffering – one didn’t try 
hard enough to find or keep a job, one didn’t put oneself on the market often 
enough, one didn’t prepare for the market well enough, one didn’t learn how 
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to show or demonstrate one’s capacities, etc. One didn’t sell oneself well 
enough. But I do think that sometimes, when we find ourselves falling into 
complete pessimism, from which we can find no exit, maybe it’s because we 
let our suffering become too private, that we’ve allowed the suffering to 
become too individual, in other words: we follow the neo-liberal imperative 
to produce oneself with very few resources in the midst of devastation. The 
alternative before us would be to identify the common elements and even 
the structuring conditions that reproduce us in our isolated suffering, trying 
to obey a manic imperative we know to be impossible. So, moving out of that 
isolation, I do believe – it may start with commiseration and a sense of relief 
that one is not alone, but it may become something more, a thinking and 
acting in concert articulates a different kind of sociality that may well remind 
us of the limits of individualism and our common power.
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